Trial Court Requests Affirmance of its Order Transferring Venue of a Nursing Home Negligence Case Out of Philadelphia and to Delaware County

In the case of Bennett v. Providence Operator, LLC, No. June Term, 2024, No. 240603252 (C.P. Phila. Co. March 4, 2026 Cohen, J.), the trial court judge issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s finding that venue was improper in this nursing home malpractice case filed in Philadelphia County. The trial court had transferred the case to Delaware County after finding that all relevant conduct occurred at the Defendant’s facility that was located in Delaware County. The court noted that the Defendant only had incidental marketing contacts with Philadelphia County.

As such, the trial court had granted the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections as to improper venue.

The court otherwise emphasized that advertising and solicitation do not constitute conducting business. 

The court additionally noted that any revenue generated from Philadelphia residents at the Defendant’s facility was incidental to the care provided in Delaware County.

The trial court additionally rejected the argument that venue was proper in Philadelphia County given that the pre-admission assessment was conducted while the Plaintiff’s decedent was hospitalized in Philadelphia. The court rejected the argument that this constituted a transaction giving rise to the cause of action. 

Rather, the court found that the claims instead of arose from the care provided at the Defendant’s facility and not from the admission decision itself. In this case, the claims of injury were with respect to a fall down event that the Plaintiff decedent allegedly had at the facility in Delaware County.

As such, the trial court found that all relevant transactions and occurrences took place in Delaware County, where the alleged negligence occurred. 

Accordingly, the trial court urged the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s finding that venue in Philadelphia County was improper and that the Order transferring the case to Delaware County should be affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 2, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Protections Afforded by Mental Health Procedures Act Relative to Mental Health Records in Discovery

In the case of Morreck v. Karns, No. 2025-CV-1140 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 12, 2026 Minora, S.J.), the court addressed discovery issues in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the court’s decision, the Plaintiff alleged physical injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident but confirmed that she was not alleging any independent psychological injury as a result of the accident.

At issue in this matter was the Plaintiff’s objection to the Defendant’s subpoenas for medical records.   In the subpoenas, the Defendant specifically excluded from production any records concerning mental health or psychiatric treatment from either before or after the subject accident.

The Plaintiff objected to the subpoenas, raising concerns of a possible unintended release of information protected by privileges afforded by the Mental Health Protections Act, 50 Pa. C.S.A. §7111.

Senior Judge Carmen Minora
Lackawanna County

In his decision, Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas confirmed that mental health records were indeed privilege under the MHPA. 

However, the court noted that a patient can waive the confidentiality protections under the MHPA where, as judged by an objective standard, the Plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the Plaintiff’s mental health would be placed directly at issue by the filing of a lawsuit.

However, here, where the Plaintiff had not placed her mental health at issue, the court found that the Plaintiff had not waived any confidentiality protections under the MHPA. 

As such, the court precluded discovery on any mental health treatment records and allowed discovery only of materials that were not protected under the privileges afforded under the MHPA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joshua J. Perry of the O’Donnell Law Offices in Kingston, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

The Beginning of the End? Pennsylvania Supreme Court Agrees to Address Whether the Gist of the Action Doctrine Remains Valid Law

According to a July 14, 2026 article by Riley Brennan in The Legal Intelligencer entitled "Pa. High Court to Revisit 'Gist of the Action' Doctrine for Legal Malpractice Cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed to address the ongoing validity of the doctrine in the case of Poteat v. Asteak.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court

As Tort Talkers may recall, my son, Daniel, Jr. (now about to enter his third year at Virginia Law where he is an Articles Editor on the Virginia Law Review) and I recently published a timely article in the April, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine," in which the history of the doctrine was analyzed and and predictions were made regarding possible further developments in the law with respect to the doctrine.

We again thank Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law and Editor of the Quarterly for selecting this article for publication and for his excellent editorial assistance.

Here is the prediction from the end of the article with regards to the future of the gist of the action doctrine:

Thus, Swatt and Poteat appear to herald the beginning of the end of the gist of the action doctrine as a defense in Pennsylvania civil litigation matters. If and when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has another opportunity to consider the validity of the gist of the action doctrine, it can be reasonably anticipated that the Supreme Court will finally swat the remaining mist of this doctrine into oblivion as contrary to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, most of the current Justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will also likely see the purpose of the gist of the action doctrine in maintaining the conceptual differences between tort and contract actions as less important than allowing injured parties to explore all potential theories of recovery available under the law.

With the anticipated downfall of the gist of the action doctrine, negligence and breach of contract will no longer be viewed as causes of action encompassing different types of wrongs that have to be kept apart. Rather, these types of claims will be viewed as parts of a menu of numerous options from which plaintiffs may select when deciding how to proceed with a lawsuit, including the option of proceeding with both types of claims in a single lawsuit. The anticipated total eradication of the defense of the gist of the action doctrine will therefore serve to expand the avenues of recovery for injured parties in Pennsylvania. However, until such time that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again addresses the viability of the gist of the action doctrine and provides clarity and guidance, the courts and members of the bar will be left to grapple with implications of the Superior Court’s recent decisions on the doctrine.

To view the entire article, please click this LINK to the Tort Talk post on the article and then click the Link within that post to view the article.

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Superior Court Addresses the Parameters of the 'Common Interest Privilege' Under the Related Attorney-Client Privilege

In the case of Solid Waste Services, Inc. v. Ember Partners, LP, No. 1674 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 9, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Superior Court addressed discovery issues in a civil litigation dispute.

A primary issue addressed was whether a trial court Order granting a Motion to Compel production of documents withheld by a Defendant should be affirmed.

On appeal, the Defendant that was subject to the Motion to Compel was relying upon the somewhat novel “common interest” privilege to contend that they were legally entitled to withhold certain requested documents under a related attorney-client privilege argument

On appeal, the Superior Court noted that it agreed with the trial court’s findings that, while there may have been a common interest between the applicable parties earlier in the negotiations and dealings between the parties, the record revealed that there was no evidence of a common interest at the times relevant to the subject lawsuit. 

The Superior Court also found that the Defendant that was subject to the Motion to Compel Order did not meet their burden of proving the existence of an agreement to share the common interests privilege at any time. 

Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court finding that the common interest doctrine did not protect attorney-client communications shared with a third-party because the Defendant at issue failed to prove an agreement to pursue a shared legal strategy and also failed to show any continuing common legal interest at the relevant times in the lawsuit.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 30, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Sasun Bughdaryan on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Rules That Plaintiff's Effort To Revive a Previously Discontinued Med Mal Case Was Time Barred

The following decision is a cautionary tale for those cases where a Plaintiff discontinues a personal injury case, for one reason or another, before the matter is fully litigated and a recovery is secured.

In the case of Dixon v. Heritage Valley Sewickley, No. 307 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. May 28, 2026 Olson, J., Stabile, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated a trial court Order and held that a Plaintiff could not revive a voluntarily discontinued medical malpractice action by way of a Praecipe to Reinstate after the statute of limitations expired. 

 The appellate court ruled that attorney mistake and/or equitable considerations alone did not serve to toll the limitations period. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligent treatment of arm wounds after the Plaintiff suffered an injury. The Plaintiff alleged that he did not learn that the Defendant medical provider had failed to remove a piece of glass from his arm until that piece of glass was later removed during a subsequent emergency medical procedure.

After the Defendant had filed a Notice of Intention to Enter a Judgment of Non Pros, the Plaintiff voluntarily filed a Praecipe to Discontinue the action without prejudice.

Then, more than two (2) years after the Plaintiff alleged that he had discovered that the glass was still in his arm, the Plaintiff filed a Praecipe to Reinstate the Complaint.

The Defendant medical provider pled the statute of limitations defense in an Answer and New Matter. 

The Defendant later moved for judgment on the pleadings which was denied. The trial court reasoned that the Defendant had waived the statute of limitations defense by untimely raising it and, in the alternative, that equitable considerations allowed the claim to proceed because the Plaintiff’s attorney’s discontinuance of the case was inadvertent and was not shown to have been filed for a procedural advantage.

On appeal, the Superior Court noted that it had the ability to address the issues on appeal despite a challenge to the appealability of the same.

On the merits, the Superior Court held that the trial court had erred in treating the statute of limitations defense as waived. 

The appellate court noted that, under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, one judge at the trial court level had accepted the Defendant’s Answer and New Matter as timely and, therefore, the later judge was barred from disregarding that previous Order. The Superior Court also noted that the trial court had relied upon case law that was no longer good law due to recent Supreme Court precedent.

The court otherwise noted that the attempt by the Plaintiff to use a reinstatement praecipe to revive a previously discontinued action was improper under the circumstances of this case.  The Court noted that a reinstatement praecipe could not substitute for filing a Complaint within the statute of limitations period.

The Superior Court noted that, once a Discontinuance had been filed, this action could only proceed again by way of the filing of a new Complaint within the two year statute of limitations period.  Because that did not occur, the appellate court found that the Plaintiff's claims were time barred.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion by Judge Olson, noting that Judge's opinion that the appeal should have been quashed, can be viewed HERE


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 16, 2026).

Case Removed to Federal Court Sent Back to State Court

In the case of Mason v. Sams Club, No. 2:25-CV-05038-JHS (E.D. Pa. April 27, 2026 Slomsky, J.), the federal court remanded a slip and fall case back to state court after finding that the Defendant had prematurely removed the case to federal court.

The court noted that, under federal law, a Defendant may only remove a case when the Defendant receives a document that puts the Defendant on notice that the case is removal because the $75,000.00 jurisdiction threshold is met. Moreover, under the Rules, once the Defendant receives a document that puts the Defendant on notice that the case is removable, a case must be removed within thirty (30) days of receiving that document.

Here, the Defendant removed the case after receiving emails from the Plaintiff’s counsel that the Plaintiff was going to undergo wrist surgery as a result of the injuries.

The Plaintiff argued that the case should be remanded back to state court, claiming that the Notice of Removal was filed prematurely because the Defendant did not have notice that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00.

The court agreed, finding that the Defendant did not provide sufficiently specific information to confirm to the court that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00. Here, there was a lack of any information regarding costs, total damages, or a settlement demand, any of which could have put the Defendant on notice that the jurisdictional threshold have been met.

The court noted that, with the Defendants bearing the burden of proving that the removal was proper, the Defendant’s failure to explain how a wrist surgery alone would necessarily surpass the jurisdictional threshold left to much ambiguity.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


Source: Article – “Sams Club Slip-In-Fall Slides Back To State Court Due To Premature Removal Notice,” By Riley Brennnan of The Legal Intelligencer (May 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Jim Wilson on www.unsplash.com.

Federal Court Rejects Plaintiff's Request to Remand UIM Breach of Contract/Bad Faith Claim Back to State Court

In the case of Victoria-Melo v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. Of America, No. 5:25-CV-07282-JMG (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2026 Gallagher, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand a UIM/Bad Faith suit back to state court.

The insurance company had removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00.

The Plaintiff responded by asserting that the Defendants had failed to establish the amount in controversy. The Plaintiffs also argued that the action presented unsettled issues of Pennsylvania insurance law that would be better resolved by the state courts.

After reviewing the matter before it, the court concluded that diversity jurisdiction existed and that abstention was not warranted.

In so ruling on the issue of whether the exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the federal court considered the factors set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Reifer case. 

As part of this analysis, the court found that this case did not present the type of unsettled or novel issues of state law that would weigh in favor of abstention. 

One issue in this regard in this case is that the Plaintiff contended that the applicability of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to an insurance policy issued outside of Pennsylvania presented as an unresolved legal question. 

The court disagreed and pointed to Pennsylvania cases that had addressed the issue previously. As such, this case was found to involve the routine application of established statutory language and insurance principles to the case at hand.

As such, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Candace M. Edgar of the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall Dennehey for bringing this case to my attention.

Post-Trial Rulings By Trial Court in MVA Case Affirmed on Appeal

In their non-precedential decision in the case of Major v. Five Star Equipment, Inc., No. 735 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Mem. Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the post-trial rulings issued by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas related to a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident case.

According to the Opinion, at a bifurcated trial, the jury attributed 75% of the responsibility for the happening of the accident to the Plaintiff and 25% to the Defendant.

On appeal, the Plaintiff challenged portions of the verdict slip and related jury instructions. The Plaintiff also asserted that the trial court had erred prior to trial in granting partial summary judgment on behalf of the Defendant and dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for recklessness and in excluding post-accident evidence regarding the Defendant driver’s competence. The Plaintiff also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial.

Here, the court had bifurcated the trial based upon the fact that, after the parties were given a trial date with a certain number of trial days based on what the parties had advised the Court as to how much trial time was needed, the parties listed additional witnesses which led the court to conclude that it was highly unlikely that the parties would finish the trial within the allocated time period requested. As such, the court bifurcated the trial to avoid unnecessary cost and to facilitate the interests of judicial economy. The trial was bifurcated into liability and damages phases.

The appellate court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that they were entitled to a new trial on the basis that the trial court had incorrectly bifurcated the case. The appellate court emphasized that the decision whether or not to bifurcate a case is entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court, which is considered to be in the best position to evaluate the necessity for bifurcation.

Here, after consultation with the parties, the trial court had scheduled five (5) days for trial based upon the parties estimation as to the amount of time they believed the trial would take. Later, at a pre-trial conference, the parties then indicated that they intended to call eleven (11) lay witnesses and nine (9) expert witnesses to testify. The parties further estimated that one of the four days scheduled for trial would be taken up by the jury selection process, the court’s introductory instructions, and counsel’s opening statements.

The trial court had determined that it was highly unlikely that the remaining four (4) days of trial would be sufficient time for all of their testimony, closing arguments, jury instructions and deliberations. The trial court had expressed a concern that it would be forced to declare a mistrial if the trial is not completed within the allotted time. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the interest of judicial economy and conveniens supported the bifurcation of the case. The appellate court was not swayed by the Plaintiff’s argument that the trial actually ended up only taking three (3) days to complete.

On appeal, the appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff had waived her claim of error with regards to the Verdict slip.  The appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that separate questions as to each theory of negligence asserted against the Defendant company were unnecessary given that the trial court’s jury instructions specified and explained all of the theories of negligence involved in the case. The appellate court found that the trial court had repeatedly instructed the jury that, if they found negligence on any of the grounds described during the jury instructions, the jury must find that the Defendant company was negligent.

With regards to the trial court having issued a partial summary judgment against the Plaintiff’s claims of recklessness, the appellate court reviewed the law of punitive damages and, after a review of the trial record, found that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to support the claims of recklessness. As such, the appellate court stated that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims whether in terms of the direct actions of the Defendant company or on the basis of vicarious liability.

Based upon the above reasons, the appellate court affirmed all of the trial court’s post-trial rulings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

To view the Tort Talk post on Judge Nealon's trial court Opinion and for access to a Link to that Opinion, please click HERE.

Party's Destruction of Evidence Paves The Way For a Spoliation Sanction

In the case of United Paving, LLC v. Plaza Drive, LP, No. 1259-CV-2024 (C.P. West. Co. June 8, 2026 Smail, J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for spoliation of evidence in a breach of contract case involving paving work.

A dispute arose between the parties regarding whether the paving work was allegedly correctly completed. The Defendants in this matter allegedly did not pay the Plaintiff for the paving work completed on the basis that the work done was allegedly incorrectly completed.

After the suit was filed, a representative of the contracting party wrote to the Plaintiff’s attorney asserting that the work completed was defective and that, as such, plans were in place to mill and repave the roadway within a few days.

Plaintiff’s counsel advised defense counsel that he would like to have the Plaintiff’s own expert view the job completed within the following two weeks and that if the repaving was done within the next few days as threatened, a spoliation of evidence argument would be raised.

Counsel for the Defendants replied and indicated that the repaving work was going to go ahead as soon as possible.

The Plaintiff’s attorney was able to have an asphalt professional view and photograph the site before it was repaved. However, the Plaintiff was not able to retain an expert in time to complete a site inspection on such short notice. The repaving was then completed.

The Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Sanctions on the basis of spoliation of evidence.   

The court reviewed the current law of spoliation and noted that, under that law, where there is a non-preservation or a significant alteration of evidence by a party for a pending or future litigation, the court has the discretion to impose a range of sanctions against the spoliator.

In this matter, the Defendants argued that the they did not engage in spoliation because the road involved was allegedly in such poor condition that they had no choice but to repave it quickly. The Defendants further argued that to require roads to stay in states of alleged disrepair during litigation would be unreasonable and would violate public policy.

The court noted that, while it understood the defense position, there was no argument being made that the road would have to be preserved until the end of litigation. Rather, the court stated that the “reasonable course of action” would have been for the parties and their attorneys to cooperate to allow both sides to have adequate access to the road for expert analysis. According to the court, this could have been accomplished in a matters of days or weeks after which the road could have been repaved and the Plaintiffs would not have been prejudiced by the failure to have an equal opportunity for expert analysis.

The court found that spoliation indeed occurred under the facts presented. The entire focus of the case was the quality of the paving work completed by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant then destroyed the paving work completed by the Plaintiff shortly after the filing of their Complaint, but prior to the Defendants filing their own Answer to the Complaint. The court also noted that the Defendants were able to obtain two of their own expert reports, while essentially preventing the Plaintiff from doing the same.

As such, the court applied the standard of review under Pennsylvania law to determine what appropriate sanction was required. In this regard, the court noted that, in determining an appropriate sanctions for spoliation, the court must weigh three factors: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, a determination as to what type of sanction would serve to deter such conduct by others in the future.

In this matter, the court ruled that the Defendants would be precluded from offering into evidence any and all expert reports and any photographs of the conditions of the asphalt. Moreover, the court stated that, at the time of trial, the court would issue and adverse inference instruction regarding the spoliation of evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


It is noted that the Plaintiff’s attorney in this case was Daniel C. Hudock of the Law Office of Daniel C. Hudock in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Ray Donnelly on www.unsplash.com.

Claims Regarding Duty to Provide Safe Drinking Water Flow Through Summary Judgment Motion

In the case of McNair v. Pennsylvania-America Water Co., No. 2024-CV-5834 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 11, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a water company in a class action suit by residents of a Monroe County lake community in which the Plaintiffs had asserted claims of public nuisance under the safe drinking water statute, private nuisance, and breach of implied contract for failing to provide clean, safe, and reliable water surface to their company.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted that the drinking water supplied by the utility company was chronically tainted with excessive levels of manganese that adversely affected the color, case, smell, and safety of the water.

The utility company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds.

Relative to the request for the dismissal of certain nuisance claims based upon the statute of limitations, the court ruled that there were issues of fact under the discovery rule to the statute of limitations that prevented the entry of summary judgment in that regard.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon also found that the record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the utility’s implied duty to provide safe drinking water should be allowed to proceed to the jury.

Relative to the utility’s argument that the Plaintiff’s claims failed due to the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court found that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies only applies where the available administrative remedy is adequate and complete with respect to the alleged harm sustained and the specific relief requested. 

Here, the court found that, given that the resident’s public nuisance claims sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the diminution of the value of their property, the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land, and the inconvenience, discomfort and annoyance that they have endured, the circumstances did not meet the elements of the doctrine given that the appropriate state administrative agency had no authority to award damages. 

As such, the court found that residents were not required to first exhaust their available administrative procedures before filing suit in a court of law.

In the end, the court denied the utility’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of top image:  Photo by Wallace Chuck on www.pexels.com.

Court Addresses Various Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Allegations in a First Party Medical Benefits Case

In the case of Castellani v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2025-CV-3425 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed various issues raised in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith in a first party medical benefits case.

The Plaintiff basically asserted that the insurance company had allegedly fraudulently induced her to purchase medical expense benefits coverage that it allegedly never truly intended to provide. 

The Plaintiff also asserted that the carrier unjustifiably initiated numerous peer reviews by allegedly biased medical professionals in order to allegedly manufacturer a sham basis upon which to deny coverage for allegedly reasonable and necessary treatment.

In additional to suing the carrier for breach of contract and bad faith, the Plaintiff also sued the individual claims representative as well.

The carrier filed Preliminary Objections relative to the Plaintiff’s demand for counsel fees under §1716 and §1798 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 

The carrier also filed Preliminary Objections against the bad faith claim.

The claims representative also filed a demurrer on the claims against that party.

Challenges were also made against the claims under the UTPCPL.

The court granted the demurrer asserted by the claims adjuster after finding that the Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate a duty of care owed to the claims adjuster to the insured so as to expose the adjuster to individual tort liability.

The court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action against the carrier for bad faith. The court also found that the claims were not barred by the gist of the action doctrine. The court additionally found that the economic loss doctrine did not preclude the tort claims asserted by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Marek Studzinski on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Finds That Having Lunch At Mom's House Doesn't Make You a Resident of that House When You Have Your Own Apartment

In the case of Lanunziata v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins., No. 2026 Pa. Super. 97 (Pa. Super. May 13, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action in which the child of the insured was seeking UIM benefits under his parent’s automobile policy following an accident.

According to the Opinion, under the policy in question, an insured included the named insured and any family member.  A family member was defined, in part, as a resident of the insured's household. 

Here, the record before the court confirmed that the child had moved out of his parents’ home several years before the incident and spent a majority of his time in his own apartment.

After reviewing the case law on the issue of "residency" in this context, the Superior Court rejected the claim that the Plaintiff was a resident of his parents’ home.  The Plaintiff asserted that he ate lunch at his parents' house on a regular basis, had his mail delivered there, and had left a few personal items at his parents’ home.

The Court noted that the Plaintiff had graduated from college in 2016 and had leased an apartment in 2019 and had no intention of returning to his parents' home to live. 

The Court found that the evidence confirmed that the quantity of contacts and time that the Plaintiff spent in his own apartment greatly outweighed his contacts with his parents home.

As such, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the coverage question presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges of The Pennsylvania Bar News (June 15, 2026).

Artificial Citations Lands Another Attorney in Trouble in Pennsylvania

Another Pennsylvania attorney has been sanction for submitting filings in federal court containing AI hallucinations.

In the case of Twigg v. BSN Sports, Inc., No. 4:23-CV-00067-MWB (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2026 Brann, C.J.), Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann sanctioned an attorney by fining him $1,500 and suspending him from practicing in the Middle District Federal Court for six months due to the submission of filings by the attorney containing AI-generated hallucinated citations.

The Court found that the attorney had violated Rule 11 by submitting fabricated and inaccurate case citations.  In his Opinion, Judge Brann also expressed his displeasure with the attorney attempting to shift the blame relative to his responsibility for submitting the erroneous citations contained in the brief that was filed with the Court.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Brann's May 21, 2026 decision in this case may click this LINK.  The portion of the Opinion covering the AI issues is near the end of the Opinion.

The Court's June 18, 2026 Order entering sanctions can be viewed at this LINK.

Source: Article - "Fed. Court Suspends Pa. Attorney for AI-Hallucinated Citations," by Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 22, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Zach M on www.unsplash.com.

Medical Malpractice Case Transferred Under Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Gearhart v. Geisinger Health, No. 2025-CV-44 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 5, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue of this case from Lackawanna County to Mifflin County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  

According to the Opinion in this medical malpractice case, Mifflin County Plaintiffs commenced a suit against a Mifflin County podiatrist and nurse practitioner, a Union County physician assistant, a Mifflin County hospital, and their employer and corporate parent, which were both headquartered in Montour County. 

After reviewing the evidence presented to the court, Judge Nealon noted that a trial of this matter in Lackawanna County, which is more than 130 miles from the sites of the primary treatment locations and associated evidence would be unduly burdensome for the individual Defendants and would impose considerable hardships relating to their professional and family responsibilities.  

The court also held that Mifflin County would provide far easier access to material witnesses possessing pertinent information and other sources of proof regarding the claimed negligence and damages.  

Accordingly, based upon a totality of the circumstances, the court found Lackawanna County was an oppressive forum for the continued litigation of the malpractice action.  Consequently, the court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(d)(1).  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Article: Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

The below article of mine recently appeared in the June 18, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

June 18, 2026

By

Daniel E. Cummins


In most instances, once a civil litigation matter is settled, the defendant’s liability insurance carrier promptly issues payment. In this regard, the carrier has an interest in both protecting its insured in this regard and in closing out another file. However, in rare instances, a settlement payment may be delayed for an inordinate period of time for one reason or another.

When a settlement payment is delayed, plaintiffs have options to compel the production of the settlement payment or to secure sanctions against the defendant relative to the delay. Most settlement agreements themselves outline when payment is due. And, whether or not there is such a provision in a release regarding the timing of a payment, plaintiffs also have the benefit of the mandate under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1, which requires that the settlement payment be “delivered … within 20 calendar days from the defendant’s receipt of an executed release.”

In terms of the status of Pennsylvania law in this regard, it is often said by many that, if one needs a thorough overview of the current status of a particular area of the law, one should look for a decision on the issue written by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. This advice holds true with Nealon’s recent opinion in the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), in which Nealon addressed the topic of remedies available to a plaintiff under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 where a defendant fails to produce a settlement payment in a timely fashion after the receipt of an executed release.

According to the opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against the health care and rehab center. The plaintiff’s decedent’s had been a patient at the defendant’s facility. The defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the defendant were insolvent and in bankruptcy proceedings. Defense counsel also confirmed that, as such, the defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000 of any settlement as that represented the amount of the defendant’s deductible, but that any obligation above that amount would be covered by the defendant’s liability insurance policy.

As a result of the mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000 but the plaintiff agreed to waive the defendant’s payment of its $75,000 deductible. The net settlement payment of $175,000 was to be paid entirely by the defendant’s liability insurance carrier.

The court’s opinion emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster had agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issues existing between the defendant and its insurance company.

After the settlement, the plaintiff proceeded to court on a petition for court approval of the settlement in this death case. The court granted the Plaintiff’s petition and approved the settlement. The parties then executed the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff’s counsel then sent the signed release, the court order approving the settlement and other closing documents to the defendant’s counsel and requested the settlement payment.

In his opinion in this Hill case, Nealon emphasized that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication or even a suggestion that a coverage issue may exist between the defendant and its insurance company. Nor was there any reference that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the plaintiff would receive the settlement payment.

Thereafter, when plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check, defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. Again, there was no reference made to any insurance coverage issues.

The opinion of the court noted facts that showed that the plaintiff’s attorney showed great patience and was more than accommodating in his repeated efforts to secure the production of the settlement check over the next several months. After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 relative to the defendant’s failure to produce the settlement check in a timely fashion after the production of the executed release.

Judge Nealon reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within 20 days of the receipt of an executed release by the defendant.

The rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, the mandated 20-day time period under Rule 229.1 does not become operative until the settlement is so approved.

Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if a defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, a plaintiff has the right to seek either of two remedies. First, a plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and request that the matter return to the trial list. Second, a plaintiff can seek certain sanctions against the defendant.

The court in Hill noted that, if the plaintiff opt to pursue sanctions against the defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the plaintiff to file an affidavit “attesting to nonpayment,” and to submit six items for the court’s review with the affidavit. Among the documents to be submitted with the affidavit are a copy of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” a copy of “the executed release,” a copy of “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed release,” a certification by counsel “the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties.” Lastly, also attached to the affidavit should be “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” of Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 for execution by the court.

Nealon additionally noted that the type of sanctions allowed in this instance are spelled out under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1. More specifically, under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that a defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within 20 days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the First Edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus 1%, not compounded, running from the 21st day to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.”

Nealon otherwise ruled in the Hill case that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the plaintiff’s request for sanctions relative to the failure of the carrier to produce the settlement check within 20 days of the production of the executed release.
Conclusion

The Hill decision written by Judge Nealon provides thorough guidance on the steps to take in securing sanctions relative to a late payment of settlement funds required by an executed release.

As evidenced by plaintiff’s counsel’s actions in the Hill case, it is advisable for the plaintiff to show some patience while repeatedly requesting, in writing, the settlement payment once the mandated 20-day time period has expired for the timely production of the check. By showing some patience and creating a written record of repeated requests for the production of the check, the plaintiff will be able to bolster their request for sanctions as opposed to the case where a plaintiff runs to the courthouse on a motion for sanctions on the 21st day after the release was received by the defense counsel.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.




Reprinted with permission from the June 18, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Court Finds That Determination of Whether Plaintiff Was an Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser is for the Jury

In the case Martin v. Cable Services Co., Inc., No. CV-2025-00988 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 23, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied Preliminary Objections filed by various Defendants in a premises liability case involving the death of the Plaintiff. One of the Defendants involved was charged with criminal homicide.

According to the Opinion, an incident took place at the business premises of Cable Services Co., Inc. which resulted in the death of the Plaintiff’s decedent. As a result of that incident and death, one of the Defendants was charged with criminal homicide. No more details regarding the facts of the incident were provided in the Opinion.

This Opinion addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by certain Defendants against the Complaint. The Defendants essentially asserted that the Plaintiff’s reference to a corporate safety manual in the Complaint was insufficient to establish any duty owed to the decedent because the decedent was not an employee of Cable Services on the date of the incident.

The Defendants additionally asserted that the allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to establish that the decedent was a public invitee to whom the Defendants owed a duty of care.

Judge William P. Carlucci
Lycoming County

Judge William P. Carlucci noted that he was declining to determine whether or not the Defendants owed a duty of care to the decedent at this Preliminary Objections stage. The court noted that, generally speaking, in premises liability cases, the determination of whether an individual is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser is a question of fact for the jury.

The court also noted that the issues of foreseeability with respect to the harm suffered by the decedent is also ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.

As such, the various Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendant were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026).

Judge Allows Trip And Fall Case To Proceed Beyond Summary Judgment

In the case of Bonnell v. Knight-Confer Funeral Home, Inc., No. CV0-2023-01345 (C.P. Lyc. Co. March 23, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a trip and fall case based upon the expert opinion of the Plaintiff’s expert engineer creating questions of fact to be decided decision by the jury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell on a step on the Defendant’s premises. During her deposition, the Plaintiff did not assert that there was any debris on the step where she fell,  Nor did the Plaintiff point to any defect in the step itself.

Rather, the Plaintiff testified that she opened the door and thought she was stepping onto the sidewalk and, as a result, missed the step and fell.

The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the complete absence of any debris or any defects with regards to the step confirm that there was no material evidence upon which a jury could base any finding of negligence. The Defendant additionally pointed out that the Plaintiff had traveled over the same step on her way into the building without incident.

The Plaintiff’s opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was based, in part, on the fact that the Plaintiff produced an expert engineering report. That expert offered an opinion that the single step condition at the threshold of the doorway created a hazardous condition which endangered the public. The expert further concluded that the actions and/or inactions of the Plaintiff did not cause the incident to occur. The expert otherwise noted that the step was below the normal line of sight and the Plaintiff was therefore unable to perceive it as she exited the doorway.

After reviewing the record before him as applied to Pennsylvania law, the judge noted that, if the jury believed the testimony of the Plaintiff’s engineering expert, a jury could reasonably find that the condition at the threshold of the doorway was a hazardous condition which endangered the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff’s own conduct was not a legal cause of her injuries. 

Accordingly, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and allowed the case to proceed forward.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Becca Lavin on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Provides Lessons on Propriety of New Matter Pleading by Defendants

In the case of Cancilliere v. Custom Etch, Inc., No. 11163 of 2025, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. May 4, 2026 Flannery, J.), the court addressed the propriety of allegations contained in a Defendant’s New Matter in a civil litigation case.

According to the Opinion, the civil litigation matter arose out a dispute relative to the application of a trust agreement.

After the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and the Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter, the Plaintiffs filed Preliminary Objections to the Defendant’s New Matter asserting that the allegations contained within the New Matter were improper pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1030 and that the allegations lacked the specificity required by Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a).

More specifcally, the Plaintiff initially asserted that the allegations contained within the Defendant’s New Matter were improper under Pa. R.C.P. 1030 as the allegations did not set forth affirmative defenses.

The court noted that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a), it is provided that a Defendant may assert affirmative defenses in a New Matter in response to a Complaint. The court also noted, howerver, that Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a) additionally expressly provides “[a] party may set forth as new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.” See Op. at p. 4.

The court read this portion of the Rule in to indicate that a responding party may assert new facts in a New Matter which were not previously pled in the Complaint.

The court additionally noted that a New Matter may include conclusions of law, such as an allegation that a Complaint failed to state a cause of action, but that, under Pennsylvania law, no responsive pleading by the Plaintiff is required in response to any conclusions of law contained in a New Matter. See Op. at p. 4.

Based upon the above, the court additionally noted that, when the allegations in a New Matter are either mere conclusions of law or merely a reiteration of the same facts that may have already been placed into issue in the Complaint of the Plaintiff or the Answer of the Defendant, then the Plaintiff is not required to provide a response to the same allegations in a New Matter. Rather, such allegations would be deemed to be denied, and the court is not otherwise required to strike those paragraphs in the New Matter in response to any Preliminary Objections that may be filed by a plaintiff.

The court reiterated that the inclusion of conclusions of law by a Defendant in a New Matter does not require the court to strike the same from the pleading as such pleadings are permissible.

The court did go on to note, however, that general assertions by a Defendant of affirmative defenses lacking any factual allegations in a New Matter do violate Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) given that a Plaintiff would be unable to confirm or deny those paragraphs. Such general allegations within a New Matter can be attacked by Preliminary Objections. 

The court noted that a Defendant must pled facts to support the existence of an affirmative defense and, the failure to do so, will result in the court sustaining a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity in violation of the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) with regards to pleadings.

The court also noted that, when a court sustains a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity relative to a New Matter defense, the Defendant should generally be given an opportunity to amend its New Matter to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1019.

Here, in this case, the court denied the Preliminary Objections given that while the Defendant’s allegations in the New Matter were insufficient to create a factual basis for potential affirmative defenses, in this case, the Defendants were not attempting to assert affirmative defenses in the New Matter but rather, were providing additional facts on the case presented as permitted by Pa. R.C.P. 1030.

The court also noted that its review of the factual allegations in the New Matter confirmed that the Plaintiff had the capability of either admitting or denying the Defendant's factual allegations.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s complaint that the New Matter contained legal conclusions, the court reiterated that the Plaintiff was not required to file a response to those types of allegations as they would be deemed to be denied.  The court reiterated that there is no legal basis for the court to strike those paragraphs simply because such allegations may have amounted to legal conclusions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by G. Fring on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Plaintiff's Expert To Testify in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Pratt v. Shahid, No. CV-23-00720 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 14, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied the Defendants’ Motion In Limine seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing the testimony of a doctor in a medical malpractice case.

In this case, the court denied the Defendants’ request for an exclusion of the Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony given that the Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was found to be supported by medical literature.

The court also noted that the Defendants’ challenge went to the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions rather than the methodology utilized by the expert. 

The court found that the Plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was not novel, as it was similar to the methodology used by the Defendants’ expert. The court further noted that, even if the Plaintiff’s methodology was considered to be novel, it was still generally accepted in the scientific community as supported by articles from scientific journals submitted by the Plaintiff.

In the end, the court ruled that, while the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions differed from those advanced by the Defendants’ expert, that difference is not a proper basis for excluding the testimony of the Plaintiff’s expert.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026). 

Issues of Fact Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment in Case Challenging the Design of an Intersection

In the case of Leger v. Martin, No. 253 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 19, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, J., Wolf, J., Leadbetter, J.) (Op. by Cohn Jubelirer, J.), the Commonwealth Court reversed a lower court’s entry of summary judgment granting a township summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident matter in which allegations were made that the intersection at issue was a dangerous intersection.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff commenced a left hand turn from a stop sign and was hit by a tractor trailer.

The Plaintiff sued various parties including the township. The Plaintiff alleged that the township was liable under a duty to design, construct, and maintain its roads in a safe condition for travelers, including having proper signage and intersection site triangles. The Plaintiff also asserted that the township placed and/or directed to be placed a stop sign at the intersection with insufficient sight distances. The Plaintiff otherwise noted that the stop sign created a dangerous condition of which the township had actual or constructive notice, making the township liable under exceptions to the governmental immunity provided under §8542 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The trial court had granted the township’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The primary argument by the township on appeal was that the Plaintiff had not produced evidence showing that the stop sign had caused or contributed to his injuries, that the township had notice of any dangerous condition, or that the township owned the intersection because it was controlled by PennDOT.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the notice issue was for the jury and that summary judgment had, therefore, been improperly entered. The court pointed to evidence before it, including expert reports, indicating that the township would have been responsible for the initial design of the intersection and that the evidence established that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the alleged dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable inspection before the subject crash.

Accordingly, the granting of summary judgment in favor of the township was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Josiah Niklas on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Finds that Plaintiff's Med Mal Claims Were Sufficiently Stated in Complaint

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Dasilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, No. 1707 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2026 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court reversed a trial court’s decision in a medical malpractice case sustaining the Preliminary Objections of the Defendant hospital dismissing the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint due to the alleged insufficiency of the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Primarily, the Defendants asserted, in part, that the Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and agency were vague and/or insufficiently specific.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reinstated the medical malpractice action after finding that the Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the medical staff failed to properly monitor a patient who was experiencing a psychiatric episode by allowing the patient to leave the emergency room at which point he was then struck by a vehicle.

The appellate court concluded that the Plaintiffs had met the state’s fact-pleading standard by outlining key facts, including the Plaintiff’s mental state, the awareness of the hospital staff of the Plaintiff’s condition, and the alleged failure of the hospital staff to monitor or prevent the patient’s departure from the hospital.

The appellate court otherwise held that a Plaintiff need not identify any specific employees in the medical malpractice case in order to pursue vicarious liability claims against a hospital. The court noted that references contained in the Complaint to the emergency room staff were sufficiently specific to enable the Defendants to respond to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Dasilva may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Abington Hospital Must Face Med Mal Claims Over Patient’s ER Escape, Pa. Appellate Court Says,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by National Cancer Institute on www.unsplash.com.

Court Gives Detailed Opinion on Sanctions Applicable to Late Payment of Settlement Funds

In the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Petition filed by a Plaintiff seeking to impose sanctions against a Defendant under Pa. R.C.P. 229.1 for failing to deliver settlement funds in a timely fashion after an executed Release was produced by the Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against a healthcare and rehab center.

In this matter, the Defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the Defendant were insolvent and/or in bankruptcy proceedings and confirmed that the Defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000.00 of any settlement but that any obligation thereafter would be covered by insurance.

After a mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000.00. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000.00 but the Plaintiff agreed to waive the Defendant’s payment of its $75,000.00 deductible with a net settlement payment of $175,000.00 to be funded entirely by the Defendant's insurance carrier.

The court’s Opinion in this matter emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issue between the actual Defendant and its insurance company.

Thereafter, in this death case, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Petition for Court Approval of the Settlement. 

The Plaintiff then executed the settlement agreement and sent the signed Release, the court Order approving the settlement, and other closing documents to the Defendant’s counsel and requested payment.

The court point out that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication, or even a suggestion, that a coverage issue may exist between the Defendant and its insurance company or that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the Plaintiff would receive the settlement payment. 

After the closing documents were produced and the settlement check was not forthcoming, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check.  Defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. There was no reference made to any insurance coverage issue during that interaction.

After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the Plaintiff filed the Motion at issue.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within twenty (20) days of the receipt of an executed Release by the Defendant. 

The Rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, then the 20 day deadline under Rule 229.1 does not begin to run until the settlement is so approved.

Judge Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if the Defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, the Plaintiff has the right to seek one of two possible remedies. First, a Plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and allow the matter to return to the trial list. Second, the Plaintiff can seek sanctions against the Defendant.

The court noted that, if a plaintiff opts to pursue sanctions against a defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the Plaintiff to (1) file an affidavit “attesting to non-payment,” to submit copies of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” and/or “the executed Release,” and “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed Release,” (2) file certifications by counsel “of the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties,” and (3) file “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” for execution by the court.

The court also noted that under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that the Defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within twenty (20) days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the Release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus one (1) percent, not compounded, running from the 21st day after the production of the executed Release to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.

The court otherwise ruled that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.  Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion and awarded sanctions pursuant to Rule 229.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by kaboom pics on www.pexels.com.

Law Allowing For Fines For Holding A Cell Phone While Driving Starts Tomorrow June 5th

A new Pennsylvania law that bans a driver from holding a cell phone while behind the wheel goes into effect tomorrow, June 5, 2026.

These fines are starting after a year of police officers issuing warning tickets in this regard.

Starting tomorrow, officers may issue tickets carrying a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees.

Note that simply holding a phone, propping up a phone, or reaching for a phone can trigger a ticket.  You could even be issued a ticket for holding your phone at a red light or while stopped in traffic.

Drivers are permitted to use their phones to alert authorities in an emergency.

Also, drivers may still use hands-free technology to make phone calls, to use a GPS, or to listen to music.

It remains to be seen how a related violation of this statute may impact a personal injury motor vehicle accident matter.