Summary Judgment Granted in Supermarket Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Jordan v. Brown’s Superstores, Inc., Aug. Term 2023, No. 02262 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Yu, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case involving a Plaintiff who allegedly slipped and fell on pieces of watermelon on a supermarket floor.

The trial court noted that the Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the Defendant had created the hazard. The Plaintiff also did not produce any evidence that the store had any actual knowledge of the pieces of watermelon being on the floor prior to the Plaintiff’s fall.

Moreover, no evidence was produced that would enable the Plaintiff to prove constructive notice on the part of the store. More specifically, there is no evidence presented as to how the pieces of watermelon came to be on the floor, or how long they had been present.

In addition to entering summary judgment for these reasons, the court also noted that the Plaintiff did not file any response to the Motion.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment provided an independent procedural basis to support the granting of the summary judgment motion under Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(d).

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image: Photo by Shamblen Studios on www.unsplash.com.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 12, 2026).

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Court Rules that Placement of Wet Floor Signs Constitute Adequate Warning

In the case of Pitts v. Sonesta Intern. Hotel, Corp., No. 231002600 (C.P. Phila. Co. Nov. 24, 2025 Moore, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a hotel in a case where a Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor in the hotel’s foyer area.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell in an area where a maintenance worker for the hotel had recently mopped the floor but had also put out yellow caution signs. Videos surveillance footage confirmed that the maintenance worker had put the signs out.

According to the Opinion, during her testimony, the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the signs inside the foyer. However, the Plaintiff claimed that she did not see the signs before she slipped and fell.

At trial, the court granted the defense Motion for a Non Suit on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the jury once the Plaintiff rested and given that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a right to relief.

The court emphasized that, in Pennsylvania, a business owner had a duty to maintain a reasonably safe property and must either fix dangerous conditions or warn invitees about them.

The court additionally noted that invitees are expected to be aware of their surroundings in order to appreciate possible dangers and also to appreciate warnings of any hazards.

Here in this case, the court found that, by clearly placing the yellow “Wet Floor” signs on the floor in the hotel foyer, the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff about the possibility of the foyer floor being slippery.

The court emphasized that the Plaintiff acknowledged the presence of the wet floor signs inside the foyer before she walked into the area. On cross-examination at trial, the Plaintiff agreed that she had seen at least one (1) of the yellow signs before she entered the foyer and prior to falling down. The trial court noted that, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it was the trial court’s opinion that the Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving that the Defendant was liable for her fall.

Notably, the court noted in its Opinion that the placement of yellow warning signs in and around the foyer was conduct that established that the Defendant had adequately warned the Plaintiff of the dangers of the wet floor.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s suggestion that the hotel should have also have had someone standing near the foyer to tell customers inside the hotel that the floor was wet. The court found that this was not a reasonable requirement and that the law does not require a business owner to undertake such unreasonable measures to warn of hazards on the property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Sandiyu Nuryono on www.pexels.com.

Summary Judgment Granted Due to Lack of Actual or Constructive Notice of a Spill

In the case of Donahue v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. 2:24-68 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025 Dodge, M.J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

The court ruled that the mere existence of an allegedly harmful condition or the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence nor does it create a presumption of negligence.

In this matter, the court confirmed that the Plaintiff did not have any evidence of any actual notice on the part of the Defendant of the alleged spill.

The court additionally found that evidence of seven (7) incidents over the previous five (5) years in other areas of the store were insufficient to impute knowledge on the part of the Defendant.

The court also noted that the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the amount of time that the alleged spill existed.

Without such evidence, the court noted that a claim of constructive notice cannot be supported. The court also noted that constructive notice cannot be shown by a negative inference.

Any speculation about how long the alleged condition may have existed before the start of the surveillance video available was insufficient.

The court also held that liability cannot be based on the Defendant’s failure to adhere to its own inspection policies or that its inspection policies were generally inadequate. Rather, there may be a duty of care before there can be a breach.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Eva Bronzini on www.pexels.com.

Superior Court Rules That 3 Hour Delay Between End of Snowstorm and Beginning of Cleanup Was Not Unreasonable (Non-Precedential)

It appears that it is reasonable in Pennsylvania to have a cup of coffee or tea and enjoy the sight of a freshly fallen snow before having to go out and shovel.

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Melvin v. Sellani, No. 1234 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Dec. 31, 2025 Bowes, J., Stabile, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Stabile, J.), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant landowners and property manager in a slip and fall matter involving ice and/or snow.

The trial court decision entering summary judgment in favor of the Defendants had been entered by Judge Richard M. Hughes, III of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas.

Relative to the hills and ridges argument, the court noted that the Plaintiff failed to present evidence to establish when photographs of the scene of the incident were taken. There were conflicting statements as to whether the photos were taken the day of the incident or shortly thereafter. As such, the court noted that the photographs relied upon by the Plaintiff were not sufficient to create any material issues of fact as to whether the Defendants were under a duty to remedy any alleged hills and/or ridges of snow at the time of the incident.

The Superior Court otherwise observed that the Plaintiff failed to establish that an unreasonable of time had passed between the snowstorm and the alleged dangerous accumulation of snow or ice.

By the Plaintiff’s own testimony, it was snowing when she arrived at work at 6:30 in the morning on the day of the fall. The Plaintiff also confirmed that the snow had stopped by 3:00 p.m. when she left work. Three (3) to five (5) inches of snow had accumulated.

It was additionally indicated that the Defendant property manager indicated that he had begun to remove snow at 9:30 a.m. at the Plaintiff’s residence. The Plaintiff confirmed that the property manager was still working at snow removal when the Plaintiff arrived at home.

The court noted that, even if the snow had stopped immediately when the Plaintiff arrived at work earlier that morning, the Plaintiff provided no case law to support an argument “that a 3-hour delay between the cessation of the snow and the beginning of the clean up effort constitute[d] an unreasonable delay.” See Op. at 7.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Jill Wellington on www.pexels.com.

Summary Judgment Denied in Supermarket Parking Lot Pothole Case

In the case of Schwab v. Giant Food Stores, No. 2024-CV-3936 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 2, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court denied summary judgment in a supermarket parking lot slip and fall involving a pothole.

In its responsive pleadings, the supermarket denied liability and also asserted that it did not own or control the parking lot at issue.

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff asserted that discovery was ongoing with respect to the ownership and maintenance of the parking lot at issue.

The court noted that the supermarket Defendant merely alleged in its pleadings and its Motion for Summary Judgment that it did not own or maintain the parking lot. However, the supermarket Defendant did not submit any evidence in support of that allegation.

As such, the court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment based on issues of fact and allowed the case to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Denied in Parking Lot Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Shea v. Kalahari Resorts & Conventions – Poconos, No. 3:23-CV-814 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2025, Mariani, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall matter involving ice and snow on sidewalks.

In this matter Judge Mariani initially overruled the Defendant's Motion in Limine to preclude the Plaintiff's engineering expert from testifying at trial.

The court also noted that it could not state, from the information in the record, that the winter conditions in the parking lot of the Defendant's premises amounted to an open and obvious condition.   

The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not the hills and ridges doctrine applied. In this regard, the court noted that the storm at issue had ended eleven (11) hours prior to the accident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Summary Judgment Granted in Store Bathroom Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Staley v. Price Chopper, No. 3908-CIVIL-2024 (C.P. Monroe Co. Aug. 11, 2025 Williamson, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall matter that occurred at a grocery store.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff visited a grocery store and went to use the lady’s restroom. While in the restroom, the Plaintiff allegedly slipped on some unknown substance and fell.

After the completion of discovery, the defense filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to show how or when the alleged substance came to be on the floor and/or that the store employees had any actual or constructive notice of the condition.

The court agreed with the defense position. The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence as to what substance allegedly caused her to fall. The Plaintiff admitted that she did not notice any wet spots on the floor before she fell. 

All the Plaintiff could state at her deposition was that she knew there was a liquid on the floot because her clothes were wet after the incident.  However, the record revealed not only that it may have been raining on the day of the accident but also that, when the Plaintiff fell in the bathroom stall area, her arm and hand had gone into the toilet.

The court also noted that, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the only conclusion is that the Plaintiff allegedly may have slipped on something wet. The court noted that it is not unusual for wet spots to be found in public restrooms, particularly around the toilet area. The court held that, without some indication of what the substance actually was, for example, from a leaking toilet or a spilled hand soap, it was difficult to determine from the record whether the condition that caused the Plaintiff was a long-standing condition as opposed to a transitory one.

In this regard, the court also noted that the Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence as to the length of time that the condition existed or if the Defendant store employees knew or should have known of the alleged condition.

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant should have regularly checked the bathroom during the course of the day. The court noted that the Plaintiff did not produce any evidence in this regarding, including any chart under which employees would check off whether or not they had inspected the bathroom at certain times during day.

The Plaintiff also pointed to surveillance video of the store that shows that no employee entered the restroom for thirty (30) minutes prior to the Plaintiff’s fall. 

The court noted that while the video may show that no one attended to the restroom for thirty (30) minutes before the Plaintiff’s fall, that evidence does not translate to a finding that the Defendant was negligent in not cleaning the restroom that entire day. 

Rather, the court noted that the surveillance video simply showed that the restroom was not checked for thirty (30) minutes before the Plaintiff’s fall. The court held that this did not mean that the Defendant was aware of, or should have been aware of, an alleged dangerous condition that went unattended.

For these reasons, and others noted in the Opinion, the court granted summary judgment to the Defendant store.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

It is noted that Daniel E. Cummins of Cummins Law was defense counsel in this matter.

Source of image: Photo by Juno Jo on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Agrees That No Spoliation Occurred Where Camera Would Not Have Captured Area of the Incident

In a decision marked Non-Precedential in the the case of Conklin v. Wawa, Inc., No. 3006 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 6, 2025 Beck, J., Panella, P.J.E, Stabile, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.), the appellate court affirmed a trial court’s denial of post-trial motions in a slip and fall case.

Of note, the appellate court agreed that the Plaintiff was not entitled to an adverse inference jury charge based on the Defendant’s alleged spoliation of surveillance tapes.

In this matter, the record revealed that the video cameras could not have recorded the fall down event. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that there was no basis for the claim that the fact that the tapes were routinely overwritten amounted to an intentional destruction of evidence.

The appellate court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding a lack of any fault to the Defendant with respect to the alleged loss of the evidence. The court additionally noted that, since the claimed fall would not have been on camera, there is no showing of any relevance or prejudice with respect to this evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Rules that Defendant's Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Also Eradicates Cross-claims by Co-Defendant

In the case Robinson v. Phila. Intern. Airport, 263 C.D. 2002 (Pa. Cmwlth. June 9, 2025 Fizzano Cannon, J., McCullough, J., and Hannah Levitt, J.) (Op. by Fizzano Cannon, J.), the court granted the interlocutory appeal and addressed Motions In Limine in a municipal liability personal injury case.

This matter arose out of a slip and fall incident at the Philadelphia International Airport.  The Plaintiff apparently took a trip prior to her flight.

In this appeal, the court noted that, where summary judgment had been granted against the Plaintiffs’ claims against the municipal Defendant, that Defendant could not be held liable for purposes of contribution or indemnity relative to the Co-Defendants.

The court more specifically noted that, where the municipal Defendant had secured summary judgment on the common law ground that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on the land that the Plaintiff claimed was responsible for her injury, that Defendant likewise could not be held liable for indemnity on the cross-claims asserted by the Co-Defendants.

The Commonwealth Court additionally noted that, because the non-municipal Defendant did not oppose the municipal Defendant’s summary judgment motion against the Plaintiff’s claims, which claims were also the basis of the non-municipal Defendant’s crossclaims, that non-municipal Defendant was found to have waived any right to contest the granting of summary judgment.

That waiver and the entry of summary judgment precluded the non-municipal Defendant from later moving to have the municipal Defendant added to the verdict sheet under the Fair Share Act. This was so because the municipal Defendant, by virtue of summary judgment decision, had already been adjudicated as not being a joint tortfeasor with the Co-Defendant relative to the claims of the Plaintiff.

The Court ruled that a subsequent trial judge’s Order granting the non-municipal Defendant’s Motion In Limine to allow evidence against the municipal Defendant and to place it on the verdict sheet therefore violated the coordinate jurisdiction doctrine. As such, the court on appeal ruled that the non-municipal Defendant could certainly assert that it was not liable on the Plaintiff’s claims at trial, but that Defendant could not argue that the municipal Defendant was liable.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Alex P on www.pexels.com.

Co-Owner of Premises Not an Indispensable Party to a Slip and Fall Lawsuit Where that Co-Owner Does Not Exercise Control Over the Premises

In the case of Simone v. Alam, No. 35 MAP 2024 (Pa. March 20, 2025) (Op. by Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a slip and fall concluded that a tenant in common who did not exercise possession or control over the property is not an indispensable party in a premises liability action.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was a resident in a multi-tenant building, who slipped and fell on ice in a common area.

The Plaintiff sued the owner of the premises and asserted that he was responsible for the common areas.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to join an indispensable party, that being the owner’s brother, who was a co-owner of the property. The trial court had held that all co-owners must be joined in a premises liability action. The Superior Court affirmed.

As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that liability in premises liability cases is based upon possession and control, not mere ownership. The court noted that, since the record revealed that the owner who was sued was the sole manager who controlled the property, the owner’s brother was not an indispensable party under the circumstances.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I thank the Plaintiff’s attorney, Jacqueline Morgan, as well as Michael W. Landis, of the same law firm of Lowenthal & Abrams, P.C. in Bala Cynwyd, PA for brining this case to my attention.

Summary Judgment Granted Relative To Slip and Fall That Occurred During an Active Snowstorm

In the case of King v. Hermitage Plaza, No. 2023-CV-1055 (C.P. Mercer Co. Jan. 14, 2025 Amrhein, Jr., J.), the court entered summary judgment in a slip and fall case where the Plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot owned by the Defendant during an ongoing snowstorm.

According to the Opinion, on the day of the incident, the Plaintiff exited her place of employment during an ongoing snowstorm, walked across the parking lot owned by the Defendant and went to her vehicle. The Plaintiff then moved her vehicle closer to her place of business by parking at the curb. When the Plaintiff then exited her vehicle again at that point, she slipped and fell on the snow and/or ice that had accumulated near the curb.

The Plaintiff alleged injuries as a result and attributed the incident to the Defendant’s failure to fully remove snow and ice from the premises. The Plaintiff sued both the landowner and a snow removal contractor.

In its decision, the court reviewed the current status of the hills and ridges doctrine in Pennsylvania. The court also cited to the case of Collins v. Phila. Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 75 (Pa. Super. 2018), for the proposition that a landowner has no obligation to address any snow and ice on the premises “until a reasonable time after the winter storm has ended.”

The court in this case, again relying on the Collins decision, ruled that a period of approximately six (6) hours (or overnight) does not constitute an unreasonable passage of time concerning a landowner’s failure to remove ice and snow, particularly when a winter storm is ongoing during that period.

The court emphasized that the record in this case demonstrated that the site of the incident experienced severe winter weather conditions before, during, and after the subject slip and fall incident. The Plaintiff noted that she had observed the Defendant snow removal contractor plowing the lot approximately one hour before her fall. The court stated that this plowing activity fell within the six hour to overnight window established in the Collins case.

The court also noted that photographs of the parking lot which were taken by the Plaintiff immediately after the fall demonstrated that the lot was actively being cleared throughout the day. There was also a continued snow fall thereafter.

The court also found here that the Plaintiff did not present evidence to show that snow and ice has unreasonably accumulated to such a degree as to unreasonably obstruct travel so as to satisfy the elements of the Hills and Ridges Doctrine, or that an unreasonable time has passed after the end of a storm. 

Consequently, the Plaintiff was unable to prove the breach of duty element essential to this negligent claim. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not able to sustain a negligence claim and the court therefore entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Annie Niemaszyk on www.unsplash.com.

Third Circuit Affirms Trial Court's Giving Plaintiff the Boot in a Shoe Store Slip and Fall Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Liveshitz v. Designer Brands, Inc., No. 23-3082 (3d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025 Matey, J., Shwartz, J., and McKee, J.) (Op. by Matey, J.), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

In this case, the Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on a clear and odorless substance on the restroom floor of a store.

The Third Circuit reaffirmed the well-settled rule that a premises liability case requires that a defendant either created the harmful condition that caused the plaintiff to fall or had actual or constructive notice of that condition a sufficient time prior to the event to enable the defendant to address the condition.

Here, the court found that whether the Defendant exercised reasonable care was immaterial because there was no duty owed in the first place. The court found that the Plaintiff had failed to establish actual or constructive notice of the condition on the part of the Defendant.

The court also ruled that the Plaintiff's spoliation of evidence argument failed to create a genuine issue of material fact where there was no evidence of any actual or constructive notice on the part of the Defendant of the alleged condition that allegedly caused the Plaintiff to fall.  

The court ruled that a jury could only speculate on how long the substance at issue was on the floor before the Plaintiff encountered it.

As such, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment was affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

GROSS NEGLIGENCE: Court Denies Summary Judgment in Premises Case Involving Slip and Fall on Vomit

In the case of Johnson v. Penney, No. 2:22-CV-03665-RBS (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2025 Surrick, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, J.C. Penney relative to a slip and fall event in a case in which the Plaintiff alleged that he slipped and fell on a substance he believed to be vomit while he was shopping at the Defendant store. 

According to the Opinion, just prior to the incident, the Plaintiff was walking through the children’s department of the store, primarily looking ahead while also noticing items on the surrounding display racks. He suddenly felt a slippery substance under his feet and slipped and fell.

The Plaintiff admitted that he did not see the slippery substance on the floor prior to his fall even though his view was unobstructed. The substance on the floor was described as being 1-2 feet in diameter and was a slightly brown color that was almost the same color as the floor. 

The Plaintiff testified that he was not sure that he would have seen the substance even if he had been looking down at the floor given the similarity in color between the substance and the floor. 

There were no warning signs around at the time that the Plaintiff fell.

The court also confirmed that the Defendant store conceded that it did not immediately clean up the substance once it was reported prior to the Plaintiff's fall. An employee of the store testified that she had informed a manager on duty multiple times that there was vomit on the floor prior to the Plaintiff’s fall. The store employee stated that she was advised by the manager that the priority at the time was addressing a leak in the ceiling. 

After the Plaintiff slipped and fell, the store employee reported the incident to her manager again, at which point the substance was cleaned up.

In this matter, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s claims failed because the substance on the aisle floor was an open and obvious danger that the Plaintiff should have seen and avoided. The Plaintiff argued that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or not the substance was open and obvious condition.

The court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment and found that, drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party as required by the applicable standard of review, reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether or not, under the circumstances presented, the substance on the floor constituted an open and obvious danger.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “JCPenney Customer’s Slip-And-Fall From Bodily Substance Suit Best Left For a Jury to Decide, Judge Rules” by Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 10, 2025).

Federal Court Addresses Exception to "No-Duty" Rule In a Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Neyman v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-00226-WSS (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2024 Stickman, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant to recover for injuries that the Plaintiff sustained when he slipped and fell on a wet and muddy ramp while unloading a forklift from a tractor trailer.

The defense filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that it had not duty to the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff knew of the dangerous conditions on the ramp and chose to voluntarily walk on the ramp and was injured as a result. Essentially, the Defendants were arguing that a “no-duty” rule arises in favor of a Defendant when a danger is known and obvious to a Plaintiff and the Plaintiff chooses to voluntarily encounter that danger.

The Plaintiffs argued that the second clause of §343A, along with comment F of that Section under the Restatement (Second) of Torts created an exception to the “no-duty” rule. The Plaintiff more specifically argued that, even if a danger is known and obvious to a Plaintiff, a Defendant may still be liable if the Defendant should expect that a business invitee will not protect themselves against the danger due to being distracted at the time of the incident.

After reviewing the law as applied to the facts presented, the court held that, although it was clear that the Plaintiff knew about the dangerous condition of the ramp based upon the Plaintiff’s testimony that the ramp was indeed muddy and wet, the court otherwise found that issues of fact remained as to whether the Defendant should have anticipated a harm to the Plaintiff despite the Plaintiff’s knowledge of the ramp conditions.

There was evidence in the case that, prior to the Plaintiff’s fall, an employee of the Defendant had slipped on the ramp. Accordingly, the court noted that a jury could reasonably determine not only that the Defendant knew that the ramp was slippery, but that its slippery condition could lead to workers falling on the ramp. The court stated that it would be up to a jury to determine whether, despite the Plaintiff’s knowledge of the dangerous condition on the ramp, the Defendant should have anticipated a harm despite such knowledge on the part of the Plaintiff or the fact that the danger was obvious.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Garrett L. Trettel and Attorney Brendan B. Lupetin of the Pittsburgh, PA law firm of Lupetin & Unatin for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Ace Cranes on www.pexels.com.

Video Evidence of Frequent Recurrences of Alleged Creation of Liquid on Floor Sufficient to Create Issues of Fact Regarding Constructive Notice in a Slip and Fall Case (Non-Precedential)

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Oudolsky v. Mount Airy Casino #1, LLC, No. 3109 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Oct. 22, 2024 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

This case involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell at a casino in an area where there was a marble floor and a nearby sanitizing liquid dispenser.  Video evidence showed other patrons utilizing the dispenser in the time before the plaintiff came along and slipped and fell.

The court noted that proof of actual or constructive notice on the part of a landowner, that a dangerous condition was caused by the landowner, by way of actual notice through frequent recurrences of the dangerous condition can amount to sufficient evidence to prove liability.

The court noted that evidence from surveillance video was sufficient to create issues of fact as to both recurrence and length of time on the issue of constructive notice.

The Superior Court also noted that the close proximity of the Defendant’s dispenser to where the Plaintiff slipped on liquid is sufficient circumstantial evidence as to the source of the liquid to enable the jurors to find causation. The court noted that there was no other source for the liquid present.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck for the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Slip and Fall Case at Waterpark Allowed to Slide Past a Motion to Dismiss

In the case of Ahmed v. Kalahari Resorts & Conventions-Poconos, No. 3:24-CV-00851-JKM (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2024 Munley, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement, in a slip and fall case involving an indoor water park.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that he slipped and fell in the waterpark area allegedly due to the fact that the steps were not properly treated and were covered with mold or algae.

In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the court found that the Plaintiff had pled sufficient facts regarding his status as a business invitee and the alleged breach of a duty of reasonable care on the part of the Defendant. The court found that, if the Plaintiff’s alleged facts were accepted as true, as they must be at this stage of the proceedings, the Plaintiff had sufficiently provided a short and plain statement of the claims presented demonstrating that he is entitled to relief in accordance with F.R.C.P. 8.

Accordingly, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Relative to the Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement of the Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(e), the court agreed with the defense argument that the Plaintiff’s Complaint was too vague or ambiguous in that it did not state with specificity the location of the stairs upon which the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

In response to this motion, the Plaintiff indicated that he would provide photographs of the exact location of his fall during the course of discovery.

Judge Munley ruled that, given that the Plaintiff had admitted that he evidently knew which steps he fell upon, and given that the location of the steps at issue could affect how the different Defendants named in this lawsuit might respond to the Complaint, the court granted the Motion for More Definite Statement and directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint to more specifically assert where the Plaintiff allegedly fell on the premises.

Judge Munley otherwise raised an issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. The court noted that it could not determine from the Complaint whether the court had jurisdiction.

In this matter, the Plaintiff had alleged that jurisdiction was based on the diversity jurisdiction statute. However, the Complaint did not list the citizenship of the parties, but only the residency of the parties.

The court noted that residency and citizenship do not have the same meaning for purposes of the diversity statute. As such, the Plaintiff was directed to pile a more specific Complaint in order to properly allege the citizenship of all of the parties named in the Complaint so that the court could assure itself that jurisdiction was proper.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Slip-And-Fall Suit Cleared to Proceed Against Kalahari Indoor Waterpark.” By Riley Brennan Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 8, 2024).

Summary Judgment Affirmed in Black Ice Case Where Plaintiff Could Not Confirm That She Was Caused To Fall By Ice

In a decision marked "Non-precedential" [Why mark any decision non-precedential?!] in the case of Bywater v. Conemugh Mem. Med. Ctr., No. 1072 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Aug. 5, 2024 Kunselman, J., Murray, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the liability of a Defendant landowner in a black ice case.

According to the Opinion, at the time of the incident, in a medical center’s parking lot, the Plaintiff slipped and fell against her car when she stepped out of her vehicle. The Plaintiff then perceived that her clothes were wet. However, at her deposition, she did not testify that she saw or felt any ice in the area where she allegedly slipped.

According to the Opinion, no precipitation had recently fallen. There was snow on the ground and the sidewalks were salted. Temperatures had remained below freezing during the week leading up to the incident.

The reproduced record before the Court revealed that, at her deposition, the Plaintiff stated that she looked around and “there was nothing there.” As to why she believed that ice was involved, the Plaintiff stated that, “...[b]ecause you can’t see black ice. Why else would I fall?”

The Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant landowner given that the case established that the Plaintiff only assumed that she slipped on ice, which she never actually saw or detected.

The appellate court also noted that there was no other witness to confirm whether or not any black ice was involved in the incident.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court in affirming summary judgment noted that, “[s]imply stated if [the Plaintiff] could not see the ice that she allegedly fell upon, neither could anyone working for the medical center. If the medical center’s staff could not see the ice, then the medical center neither knew nor should have known that a dangerous, icy condition existed in its parking lot on the morning [the Plaintiff’s] fall.”

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Walt McClatchy of McClatchy Law in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Egor Kamelev on www.pexels.com.

Corrected Link For Judge Nealon's Hills and Ridges Decision in White v. Nesbeth Case

Here is the corrected LINK for the case highlighted in the September 27, 2024 Tort Talk post on Judge Terrence R. Nealon's hills and ridges decision in the White v. Nesbeth case.

Apologies for any confusion or consternation caused by the incompleted Link in the original post.

Summary Judgment Granted in Lackawanna County Slip and Fall Case

In the case of White v. Nesbeth, No. 2022-CV-2147 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 17, 2024 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of a Defendant homeowner under the hills and ridges doctrine in a slip and fall case.  The Opinion provides an excellent, thoroughly researched overview of the current status of the hills and ridges doctrine in Pennsylvania.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff, who was considered to be an invitee, and who was making a Door Dash delivery to the Defendants’ residence during an ongoing storm of “freezing rain and sleet,” allegedly slipped and fell on the homeowner’s sidewalk.

According to the record before the court, the Plaintiff’s deposition testimony acknowledged the existence of persistent freezing precipitation falling at the time of the incident. The Plaintiff additionally conceded that he did not observe or feel “any kind of an accumulation.” The Plaintiff additionally confirmed that he did not “notice anything” on the sidewalk.

After the completion of discovery, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment relying upon the hills and ridges doctrine.

The Plaintiff responded by arguing that, since the landowner applied rock salt to the sidewalk approximately forty-five (45) minutes before the Plaintiff arrived, the hills and ridges doctrine was in applicable due to “human intervention” which allegedly altered the “natural accumulation” that was falling at the time.

In granting summary judgment, Judge Nealon noted that there was no dispute that general slippery conditions prevailed at the time of the incident as a result of a continuous winter event and precipitation.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon also emphasized that no party or witness had identified or specifically described the condition upon which the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

In his Opinion, Judge Nealon pointed to appellate case law holding that a landowner is not obligated to salt their sidewalk while winter precipitation remains in progress.  He also ruled that, in any event, since the record lacked any evidence that the application of rock salt somehow created a dangerous condition or increased the natural hazards of the existing ice, the hills and ridges doctrine still applied and governed the negligence claim presented.

Judge Nealon ultimately held that, even when the record is examined in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as required by the applicable motion for summary judgment standard of review, the evidence presented was insufficient to establish a prima facie cause of action under the hills and ridges doctrine.

Accordingly, summary judgment was entered in favor of the homeowner.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Summary Judgment Granted in Premises Liability Case Due to Lack of Actual or Constructive Notice

In the case of Cummins v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 1:22-CV-01205(M.D. Pa. July 24, 2024 Schwab, Mag. J.), the court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case after finding that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of actual or constructive notice of any allegedly defective condition on the part of the store.

The court noted that the record confirmed that the lack of actual notice was not disputed. In terms of any allegation of construction notice, the court confirmed that there was no evidence that the claimed spill had existed for a significant period of time such as evidence of any footprints through the area.

The court also ruled that the fact that the spill was allegedly in multiple aisles did not, in and of itself, establish a duration of the subject spill.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.