Summary Judgment Denied in Lackawanna Slip and Fall Case

In his recent decision in the case of Santiago v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., No. 16-CV-1529 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 2, 2018 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a property owner’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall action.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was an employee of an independent contractor that was retained by the property owner to provide janitorial services.   The Plaintiff was allegedly injured in a slip and fall event on the premises.  

The Defendant-owner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that it allegedly owned no duty of care to the employee of the independent contractor.  The landowner Defendant argued that a landowner who retains an independent contractor cannot be vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor or its employees.  

However, Judge Nealon denied the Motion for Summary Judgment under the “retained control” exception to that theory of non-liability.  Under the exception, a property owner who entrusts work to an independent contractor remains subject to liability if its contract with the independent contractor grants the landowner control over the manner, method, and operative details of the independent contractor’s work.  

Judge Nealon found that there were issues of fact in this regard that required the court to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment filed.  

Anyone wishing to read this Opinion may click this LINK.

Superior Court Finds Trial Court Abused Discretion in Not Granting Continuance To Allow Party To Secure New Expert

In the case of Rutyna v. Schweers, No. 895 WDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Jan. 4, 2018 en banc) (Op. by Lazaurs, J.) (Olson, J., concurring), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the entry of summary judgment and ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiff a continuance where, through no fault of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiff’s expert was suddenly unable to testify less than three (3) weeks before trial. 

This case involved a legal malpractice action related to an underlying medical malpractice action.

In reviewing the issue presented, the Superior Court referenced Pa.R.C.P. 216 for allowable grounds for a continuance and also reviewed the factors typically considered with such requests, including whether there was prejudice to the opposing party by the delay, whether the opposing party was willing to continue the case, and the complexities involved in presenting the case.  Op. at p. 10-11 and fn. 12

The court ultimately found that, given the history of the case, the Plaintiffs were left with insufficient time to obtain a new expert.  

In its Opinion, the Superior Court emphasized that, while the swift resolution of cases is a "linchpin of judicial economy," is not an end in and of itself. Op. p. 18.

The Rutyna decision can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia law office of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention.   

Measure of Damages for Commercial Tort of Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Financial Conversion Case

In the case of Arvonio v. PNC Fiinancial Services Group, Inc., No. 11 CV 478 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 14, 2018 Nealon, J.), the court reviewed a case involving commercial torts including breach of a fiduciary duty in a financial conversion case.

More specifically, the court addressed a motion in limine filed by a defendant seeking a court ruling on the proper measure of damages in an action filed by debtors/mortgagors against their investment management company alleging breach of contract and fiduciary duties for allegedly liquidating the Plaintiff's investment management accounts without the Plaintiff's authorization to do so.

Judge Terrrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas held that 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8335 set forth the proper measure of damages as being the difference between the proceeds of the wrongful conversion of the Plaintiff's investments and the higher value that the property may have reached within a "reasonable time" after the owner received notice of the conversion.

Anyone wishing to read this Opinion online may click this LINK.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reviews Collateral Order Doctrine for Appeals

Tort Talkers may recall prior posts on the Lebanon County case of Shearer v. Hafer pertaining to whether a Plaintiff is entitle to have a representative present during portions of a neuropsychological IME. 

The Tort Talk post on the Superior Court's decision in this case can be viewed HERE.  The post on the trial court's decision can be viewed HERE.  Concisely, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order allowing a representative of the Plaintiff to be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological evaluation, but not during the standardized testing portion of the evaluation.

Now comes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision recently handed down in this case on January 18, 2018 ruling that the Pennsylvania Superior Court erred in even considering the issue on appeal as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.  As such, the Superior Court's decision on the issue was vacated.

The Majority Opinion of the Court in Shearer v. Hafer, No. 93 MAP 2016 (Pa. Jan. 18, 2018), written by Justice Todd, can be viewed HERE.

Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Mundy's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

This Opinion may be a good one to consult if you have a question on whether a trial court order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of law that the collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed and that each of the three prongs to allow for an appeal must be clearly present.

The three prongs of the collateral order doctrine as set forth under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) are:

(1) the order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action

(2) the right involved in the order is too important to be denied review by the appellate court, and

(3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until the final judgment of the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed for Final Trial in Lackawanna County District Tournament

The High School Mock Trial Competition is continuing in counties across the Commonwealth.  Please consider serving as a Juror in your County's Competition to score the high school students competing in the tournament as attorneys and witnesses. 

In Lackawanna County, Attorneys are still needed to fill the Jury Box for the Finals of the Lackawanna County Mock Trial Competition.   

These kids put hours and hours of preparation into their presentations.  It would be great for them if they could present their cases to a full Jury Box.  

If you can spare your time and expertise, it would be greatly appreciated if you could please volunteer to help the Competition by serving as a Juror.

LACKAWANNA COUNTY

MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION

Jurors needed for Final Round

Wednesday, February 28, 2018
William J. Nealon Federal Courthouse

6:00 p.m.

To Sign Up to Serve as a Juror

Contact

  LBA at 570-969-9161 

or

Ryan P. Campbell, Esq. at HRLaw04@gmail.com

 

 



Punitive Damages Claim Allowed to Proceed in Trucking Accident Case

In the case of Gaffin v. Walker, No. 7974-CV-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 30, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas overruled a trucking Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to a Plaintiff’s Complaint with respect to punitive damages alleged based upon a rear-end motor vehicle accident.  

The defense contended that the case involved a simple rear-end collision sounding in ordinary negligence.  

In response, the Plaintiff asserted that the subject accident involved a tractor trailer rear-ending the Plaintiff’s flatbed truck.  The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendant violated portions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.  

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County
 

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law pertaining to punitive damages and allegations of recklessness, the court found that the Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to allow the punitive damages claim to proceed beyond the pleadings stage.   The court cited to other cases in which punitive damages claims were allowed to proceed where a Plaintiff alleges violation of state and federal statutes pertaining to commercial vehicle driving.  

The court also noted that punitive damages could be awarded under the Plaintiff’s allegations of vicarious liability in addition to the allegations of direct conduct. 

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK.

 

I send thanks to Attorney John P. Finnerty, Esquire of the Moosic, Pennsylvania office of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.   

Allegations of Recklessness and Punitive Damages Allowed to Proceed in Trucking Accident Case

In the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas case of Rosencrance v. Smith, No. S-1535-2017 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. Jan. 19, 2018 Domalakes, J.), the court denied a Defendant's Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness and the request for punitive damages in a rear end trucking accident case.

This matter arose out of a chain reaction accident in a construction area on Interstate 81 during which the Defendant tractor trailer driver allegedly rear-ended a vehicle, causing several additional rear end impacts up ahead, including to the Plaintiff's vehicle.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law on punitive damages, the court found that the allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint were sufficient to allow such claims to proceed beyond the pleadings stage.  

More specifically, the Plaintiff averred that the Defendant tractor trailer failed to operate his vehicle at a safe and prudent speed in that he was unable to stop his vehicle without rear ending the vehicles ahead, that he failed to apply his brakes in time, failed to stop within the assured clear distance ahead, followed too closely, and violated several provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.

In the end, the court denied the Defendant's Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff's Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion, may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Stephen J. Fendler of Fendler Law Offices in Kingston, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.