Judge Ronald W. Folino of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas issued one of the most recent Post-Koken decisions in his June 28, 2011 Order without Opinion in the case of Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm, No. GDI10-016523 (Alleg. Co. June 28, 2011, Folino, J.).
This case involved a Plaintiff who sued the tortfeasor for negligence as well as the UIM carrier for UIM benefits and asserted various bad faith claims. The third party tortfeasor filed preliminary objections seeking a severance of the claims against him from the claims against State Farm.
In his Order on the tortfeasor Defendant's Preliminary Objections, Judge Folino basically combined Judge Strassburger’s holding in Collins v. State Farm with Judge Wettick’s Opinion in Wutz v. State Farm by ruling that the tort and UIM case would proceed to trial first without reference to insurance, and that the bad faith/UTPCPL claims would be presented in a non-jury proceeding immediately thereafter.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Order without Opinion in the case of Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I thank Attorney Mark A. Martini of the Pittsburgh law firm of Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP for forwarding this case to my attention.
Thursday, June 30, 2011
Judge Carmen D. Minora of Lackawanna County Allows Discovery of Incident Report in Hospital Trip and Fall Case
Judge Carmen D. Minora recently issued an Opinion on the discoverability of hospital documents, such as an incident report, pertaining to a trip and fall incident in the case of Morgan v. Community Medical Center Healthcare System, No. 2008-CV-4859 (Lacka. Co. June 14, 2011, Minora, J.).
In Morgan, the Plaintiff had previously been in a motorcycle collision and was being treated in the hospital for injuries to his arm and legs. While being treated in the hospital’s emergency department for these injuries, the Plaintiff was given an IV dose of morphine.
At some point thereafter, the Plaintiff exited the emergency room without assistance or wheelchair. He fell on the concrete and struck his head and was re-admitted to the hospital with a head injury.
According to the Opinion, the circumstances under which the Plaintiff exited the hospital involve a major dispute between the parties. The Plaintiff alleges that he was discharged after receiving the IV morphine without any precautions. The Defendant hospital asserts that the Plaintiff demanded to leave the hospital against medical advice and refused a wheelchair when offered.
At issue in this matter was the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Defendant hospital to produce an “Incident Report” prepared by the Defendant related to this event. The Plaintiff initially proceeded before the Lackawanna County Special Trial Master, Richard S. Campagna, who deemed the Incident Report discoverable. The Plaintiff appealed for a De Novo Review of the Special Trial Master’s decision and the case came before Judge Minora.
Judge Minora noted generally that the legal standards of discovery in Pennsylvania are to be liberally and generously construed to prevent surprise and unfairness and to allow a fair trial on the merits. He also noted that, if any conceivable basis exists upon which a discovery request is permissible, a motion to compel such discovery must be granted. Judge Minora additionally noted that, under Pennsylvania law, limitations on the scope of discovery are to be narrowly construed.
Judge Minora first rejected the Defendant hospital’s argument that the disclosure of the incident report was prohibited by Pennsylvania’s Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act. The Defendant had attempted to assert that, since the document at issue was prepared for the purpose of compliance with the Patient Safety Act, which is contained within the MCARE Act, such documents were not discoverable.
However, Judge Minora noted that the Defendant did not meet its burden of showing that the document was created “solely” for the purpose of compliance with the Patient Safety Act. The incident report was found to arguably have been prepared by the hospital for multiple purposes including insurance, filings, police reports, etc. Since this document may have been produced for multiple purposes other than compliance with the Patient Safety Act, the court found that the document lost its privileged status.
Judge Minora also found that the Defendant Hospital failed to meet its burden of showing that the disclosure of the incident report was prohibited under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. Again, it Court found that since there may have been reasons other than creating the document for a patient safety evaluation system in the hospital, the document lost its alleged privilege status, even if the report was ultimately presented to a patient safety organization for patient safety purposes.
As such, reiterating the liberal standards governing discovery and the preference to narrowing construe any limitations thereon, the court found that the incident report was indeed discoverable.
Judge Minora also rejected the Defendant’s requests for permission to file an interlocatory appeal on the issue, finding that the issue did not meet the standard for such an appeal as set forth under 42 Pa. C.S. §702(b).
Anyone desiring a copy of this opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
In Morgan, the Plaintiff had previously been in a motorcycle collision and was being treated in the hospital for injuries to his arm and legs. While being treated in the hospital’s emergency department for these injuries, the Plaintiff was given an IV dose of morphine.
At some point thereafter, the Plaintiff exited the emergency room without assistance or wheelchair. He fell on the concrete and struck his head and was re-admitted to the hospital with a head injury.
According to the Opinion, the circumstances under which the Plaintiff exited the hospital involve a major dispute between the parties. The Plaintiff alleges that he was discharged after receiving the IV morphine without any precautions. The Defendant hospital asserts that the Plaintiff demanded to leave the hospital against medical advice and refused a wheelchair when offered.
At issue in this matter was the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Defendant hospital to produce an “Incident Report” prepared by the Defendant related to this event. The Plaintiff initially proceeded before the Lackawanna County Special Trial Master, Richard S. Campagna, who deemed the Incident Report discoverable. The Plaintiff appealed for a De Novo Review of the Special Trial Master’s decision and the case came before Judge Minora.
Judge Minora noted generally that the legal standards of discovery in Pennsylvania are to be liberally and generously construed to prevent surprise and unfairness and to allow a fair trial on the merits. He also noted that, if any conceivable basis exists upon which a discovery request is permissible, a motion to compel such discovery must be granted. Judge Minora additionally noted that, under Pennsylvania law, limitations on the scope of discovery are to be narrowly construed.
Judge Minora first rejected the Defendant hospital’s argument that the disclosure of the incident report was prohibited by Pennsylvania’s Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act. The Defendant had attempted to assert that, since the document at issue was prepared for the purpose of compliance with the Patient Safety Act, which is contained within the MCARE Act, such documents were not discoverable.
However, Judge Minora noted that the Defendant did not meet its burden of showing that the document was created “solely” for the purpose of compliance with the Patient Safety Act. The incident report was found to arguably have been prepared by the hospital for multiple purposes including insurance, filings, police reports, etc. Since this document may have been produced for multiple purposes other than compliance with the Patient Safety Act, the court found that the document lost its privileged status.
Judge Minora also found that the Defendant Hospital failed to meet its burden of showing that the disclosure of the incident report was prohibited under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. Again, it Court found that since there may have been reasons other than creating the document for a patient safety evaluation system in the hospital, the document lost its alleged privilege status, even if the report was ultimately presented to a patient safety organization for patient safety purposes.
As such, reiterating the liberal standards governing discovery and the preference to narrowing construe any limitations thereon, the court found that the incident report was indeed discoverable.
Judge Minora also rejected the Defendant’s requests for permission to file an interlocatory appeal on the issue, finding that the issue did not meet the standard for such an appeal as set forth under 42 Pa. C.S. §702(b).
Anyone desiring a copy of this opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
Third Circuit Court of Appeals Upholds Department of Public Welfare's Recovery of Medicaid Liens
In its June 29, 2011 fifty-nine (59) paged decision in the case of Tristani v. Richman, No. 09-3537, No. 09-3538 (3rd Cir. June 29, 2011 Sloviter, Hardiman, Pollak, J.) (Opinion by Hardiman) (Pollak, dissenting), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the process by which the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare pursues recoveries of its Medicaid liens in civil litigation matters.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, for over the past 30 years, where third parties are liable in civil litigation matters for medical expenses paid out through Medicaid, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare has recouped its expenditures by asserting liens against settlements and judgments.
The Third Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 280 n.9, 291-92 (2006), assumed, without deciding, that such liens, when limited to the portion of a settlement or judgment constituting reimbursement for medical costs are an implied exception to the federal law that prohibits states from imposing liens on the property of Medicaid beneficiaries.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in this Tristani case was faced with the job of deciding “whether these liens in fact constitute such an exception.” More specifically, the issue for the Court to decide was “whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania’s statutory framework is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahlborn."
The ultimate decision by the Third Circuit Court in Tristani was that its “examination of the text, structure, history and purpose of the Social Security Act leads [the Third Circuit Court of Appeals] to conclude that liens limited to medical costs are not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act.” Accordingly, Third Circuit upheld Pennsylvania’s longstanding practice of allowing for such Medicaid liens to be recovered by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare in civil litigation matters.
It is noted that Judge Pollak issued a lengthy dissenting Opinion.
Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I thank Attorney Patrick J. Loughren of the Pittsburgh law firm of Loughren, Loughren & Loughren PC for bringing this decision to my attention.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, for over the past 30 years, where third parties are liable in civil litigation matters for medical expenses paid out through Medicaid, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare has recouped its expenditures by asserting liens against settlements and judgments.
The Third Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 280 n.9, 291-92 (2006), assumed, without deciding, that such liens, when limited to the portion of a settlement or judgment constituting reimbursement for medical costs are an implied exception to the federal law that prohibits states from imposing liens on the property of Medicaid beneficiaries.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in this Tristani case was faced with the job of deciding “whether these liens in fact constitute such an exception.” More specifically, the issue for the Court to decide was “whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania’s statutory framework is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahlborn."
The ultimate decision by the Third Circuit Court in Tristani was that its “examination of the text, structure, history and purpose of the Social Security Act leads [the Third Circuit Court of Appeals] to conclude that liens limited to medical costs are not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act.” Accordingly, Third Circuit upheld Pennsylvania’s longstanding practice of allowing for such Medicaid liens to be recovered by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare in civil litigation matters.
It is noted that Judge Pollak issued a lengthy dissenting Opinion.
Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I thank Attorney Patrick J. Loughren of the Pittsburgh law firm of Loughren, Loughren & Loughren PC for bringing this decision to my attention.
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Fair Share Joint and Several Liability Is Now the Law in Pennsylvania
On June 28, 2011, Governor Corbett signed into law SB 1131, commonly known as the Fair Share Act, which pertains to joint and several liability of defendants in civil litigation matters.
Note that this new law applies to causes of action that "accrue on or after the effective date," i.e. June 28, 2011. As such, all causes of action arising before this date, will still proceed under the old joint and several liability rule.
Under the prior joint and several law, a defendant who was found responsible for only 1 percent of the liability for an injury or economic loss could be held liable to pay 100 percent of the damages owed to the injured party; that is each defendant was "jointly liable" with all others for the full value of the damages.
With the new law, Pennsylvania now joins about 40 other states that have passed various types of reform in which parties are instead "severally liable." That is, defendants in the reform states pay damages only to the proportion of their degree of fault assessed to them by a jury. For example, if 25 percent of an injury or loss is found to be the responsibility of a single defendant, that defendant pays only 25 percent of the judgment.
Pennsylvania's Fair Share Act provides that, from this point forward, liability shall be several, and not joint, where the defendant's liability for the damage or loss is less than 60 percent of the total liability of all defendants, except under four exempted circumstances.
Under the new law, a defendant who bears the preponderance of responsibility can still be held jointly liable, i.e. responsible for the full amount of damages regardless of their percentage of fault. However, parties who bear little or only partial responsibility for an injury or loss could be held to pay no more than their percentage share of the judgment.
The four exemptions from several liability protection are, as follows:
1. A suit including an intentional misrepresentation;
2. A case of intentional tort;
3. A suit concerning the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance under the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act; or
4. A civil action in which a defendant has violated section 497 of the Liquor Code.
Note that this new law applies to causes of action that "accrue on or after the effective date," i.e. June 28, 2011. As such, all causes of action arising before this date, will still proceed under the old joint and several liability rule.
Under the prior joint and several law, a defendant who was found responsible for only 1 percent of the liability for an injury or economic loss could be held liable to pay 100 percent of the damages owed to the injured party; that is each defendant was "jointly liable" with all others for the full value of the damages.
With the new law, Pennsylvania now joins about 40 other states that have passed various types of reform in which parties are instead "severally liable." That is, defendants in the reform states pay damages only to the proportion of their degree of fault assessed to them by a jury. For example, if 25 percent of an injury or loss is found to be the responsibility of a single defendant, that defendant pays only 25 percent of the judgment.
Pennsylvania's Fair Share Act provides that, from this point forward, liability shall be several, and not joint, where the defendant's liability for the damage or loss is less than 60 percent of the total liability of all defendants, except under four exempted circumstances.
Under the new law, a defendant who bears the preponderance of responsibility can still be held jointly liable, i.e. responsible for the full amount of damages regardless of their percentage of fault. However, parties who bear little or only partial responsibility for an injury or loss could be held to pay no more than their percentage share of the judgment.
The four exemptions from several liability protection are, as follows:
1. A suit including an intentional misrepresentation;
2. A case of intentional tort;
3. A suit concerning the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance under the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act; or
4. A civil action in which a defendant has violated section 497 of the Liquor Code.
New Lackawanna County Local Rule 4000.2 - Case Management Proposals (Effective Date Not Until July 25, 2011)
The Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas adopted new Local Rule 4000.2 on June 3, 2011 pursuant to an Order signed by President Judge Thomas J. Munley. With the publication of the local rule in the PA Bulletin on June 25, 2011, Volume 41 Number 26, the rule will go into effect on Monday July 25, 2011.
Below is a copy of new Lackawanna County Local Rule 4000.2 with its related form:
RULE 4000.2. CASE MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL.
With the exception of medical malpractice cases, and upon closure of the pleadings, the Plaintiff(s) shall complete and forward to all Parties a Case Management Proposal in substantial compliance with Form 8 in the attached appendix. The Case Management Proposal shall set forth proposed deadlines for the completion of discovery, exchange of expert reports, and the filing of dispositive motions.
If the Plaintiff(s) has not received any objections to the Case Management Proposal within fifteen (15) days of mailing, the Plaintiff(s) shall submit the Proposal to the Lackawanna County Discovery Master for approval. If a Party objects to the Proposal, and the Parties are otherwise unable to agree, and upon appropriate notice as outlined in Lacka. Co. R. Civ. P. 208.2(f), the Proposal shall be submitted to the Discovery Master for resolution.
If the Plaintiff(s) shall fail to complete and forward a Case Management Proposal within thirty (30) days of the closure of the pleadings, nothing in this Rule shall preclude an Opposing Party from submitting a Case Management Proposal in compliance with this Rule.
Explanatory Comment
“Closure of the Pleadings” shall mean when all of the Parties have filed a Responsive Pleading in the form of an Answer, and a Reply to New Matter, if any.
Nothing in this Rule shall preclude a Party from seeking an Amendment to the Case Management Schedule upon good cause shown. Nothing shall preclude the Trial Court to Amend the Case Management Schedule upon request of a Party and upon good cause shown.
_____________________________________________________________
FORM 8
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY
PLAINTIFF
-VS-
DEFENDANT ________ - CIV. - __________
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Now comes, _____________________, for and on behalf of ________________, and hereby submits for approval the following case management deadlines, pursuant to Lacka. Co. R. Civ. P. :
A. All Discovery shall conclude on or before ____________________;
B. Plaintiff(s) shall exchange with the Defendant(s) all Expert Reports on or before ____________________;
C. Defendant(s) shall exchange with Plaintiff(s) all Expert Reports on or before ____________________;
D. Plaintiff(s) shall exchange with the Defendant(s) all Rebuttal Reports on or before ____________________;
E. Dispositive Motions shall be filed on or before ____________________.
I hereby certify that the aforementioned Proposal has been forwarded to all Parties on _____________________, at least fifteen (15) days have elapsed, and no Party has objected to the Case Management Proposal.
___________________________________
(MOVING PARTY)
AND NOW, this ________ day of _______________, 20____, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the aforementioned Proposal is hereby ADOPTED as an Order of Court.
____________________________________
JUDGE/DISCOVERY MASTER
Below is a copy of new Lackawanna County Local Rule 4000.2 with its related form:
RULE 4000.2. CASE MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL.
With the exception of medical malpractice cases, and upon closure of the pleadings, the Plaintiff(s) shall complete and forward to all Parties a Case Management Proposal in substantial compliance with Form 8 in the attached appendix. The Case Management Proposal shall set forth proposed deadlines for the completion of discovery, exchange of expert reports, and the filing of dispositive motions.
If the Plaintiff(s) has not received any objections to the Case Management Proposal within fifteen (15) days of mailing, the Plaintiff(s) shall submit the Proposal to the Lackawanna County Discovery Master for approval. If a Party objects to the Proposal, and the Parties are otherwise unable to agree, and upon appropriate notice as outlined in Lacka. Co. R. Civ. P. 208.2(f), the Proposal shall be submitted to the Discovery Master for resolution.
If the Plaintiff(s) shall fail to complete and forward a Case Management Proposal within thirty (30) days of the closure of the pleadings, nothing in this Rule shall preclude an Opposing Party from submitting a Case Management Proposal in compliance with this Rule.
Explanatory Comment
“Closure of the Pleadings” shall mean when all of the Parties have filed a Responsive Pleading in the form of an Answer, and a Reply to New Matter, if any.
Nothing in this Rule shall preclude a Party from seeking an Amendment to the Case Management Schedule upon good cause shown. Nothing shall preclude the Trial Court to Amend the Case Management Schedule upon request of a Party and upon good cause shown.
_____________________________________________________________
FORM 8
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY
PLAINTIFF
-VS-
DEFENDANT ________ - CIV. - __________
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
CASE MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL
Now comes, _____________________, for and on behalf of ________________, and hereby submits for approval the following case management deadlines, pursuant to Lacka. Co. R. Civ. P. :
A. All Discovery shall conclude on or before ____________________;
B. Plaintiff(s) shall exchange with the Defendant(s) all Expert Reports on or before ____________________;
C. Defendant(s) shall exchange with Plaintiff(s) all Expert Reports on or before ____________________;
D. Plaintiff(s) shall exchange with the Defendant(s) all Rebuttal Reports on or before ____________________;
E. Dispositive Motions shall be filed on or before ____________________.
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the aforementioned Proposal has been forwarded to all Parties on _____________________, at least fifteen (15) days have elapsed, and no Party has objected to the Case Management Proposal.
___________________________________
(MOVING PARTY)
O R D E R
AND NOW, this ________ day of _______________, 20____, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the aforementioned Proposal is hereby ADOPTED as an Order of Court.
____________________________________
JUDGE/DISCOVERY MASTER
Monday, June 27, 2011
New Pennsylvania Joint and Several Liability Law On its Way to Governor's Desk
SB 1131, previously approved by the Pennsylvania Senate, has been passed by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives by a vote of 116 to 83. It now proceeds to Governor Corbett's desk where it is likely to be signed into law in the near future.
Below is a link to the bill. The bill takes effect upon the governor's signature and the bill applies to causes of action that "accrue on or after the effective date."
http://ldpc6.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2011&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=1131&pn=1389
I send thanks to Tim Bittle of Bigley and Blikle, a government relations services company, for this update.
Below is a link to the bill. The bill takes effect upon the governor's signature and the bill applies to causes of action that "accrue on or after the effective date."
http://ldpc6.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2011&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=1131&pn=1389
I send thanks to Tim Bittle of Bigley and Blikle, a government relations services company, for this update.
Another Trial Court Decision Allowing Fibromyalgia Claim to Proceed to a Jury
In the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas recently joined the growing number of Pennsylvania trial courts allowing a Plaintiff to present expert testimony relating an alleged fibromyalgia condition to a traumatic event.
In the case of Getz v. Bennett, 54 Leh. L. J. 495 (Jan. 31, 2011), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Bar a Plaintiff’s Expert’s Opinion that a motor vehicle accident caused the Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia condition.
The court in Getz found that the methodology of the expert was generally accepted in the scientific community. The opinion was also found to be based upon physical and neurological examination of the Plaintiff, her medical history, and the sequence of events leading to the onset of the symptoms. The court also referenced literature linking trauma and fibromyalgia. It appears from the opinion that the court was also influence by the lack of any fibromyalgia symptoms before the subject accident.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Getz decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Here are links to other Tort Talk posts on this issue that show that the emerging trend of the Pennsylvania trial courts is to allow this form of expert testimony on the grounds that the methodology that underlies the expert's conclusion has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community:
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/07/trial-courts-continue-to-struggle-with.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/09/expert-testimony-on-fibromyalgia.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/10/judge-sibum-of-monroe-county-allows-for.html
Here's a link to a prior Pennsylvania Law Weekly article of mine on the topic, entitled "Fibromyalgia as a Diagnosis in Personal Injury Cases":
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b1fc59d-4789-4f9e-be96-f157818c6d80
Based upon the above, it appears the the overwhelming current trend is that the trial courts have been willing to allow expert opinion linking a plaintiff's alleged fibromyalgia condition to a traumatic event to proceed ahead for a jury's consideration.
In the case of Getz v. Bennett, 54 Leh. L. J. 495 (Jan. 31, 2011), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Bar a Plaintiff’s Expert’s Opinion that a motor vehicle accident caused the Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia condition.
The court in Getz found that the methodology of the expert was generally accepted in the scientific community. The opinion was also found to be based upon physical and neurological examination of the Plaintiff, her medical history, and the sequence of events leading to the onset of the symptoms. The court also referenced literature linking trauma and fibromyalgia. It appears from the opinion that the court was also influence by the lack of any fibromyalgia symptoms before the subject accident.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Getz decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Here are links to other Tort Talk posts on this issue that show that the emerging trend of the Pennsylvania trial courts is to allow this form of expert testimony on the grounds that the methodology that underlies the expert's conclusion has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community:
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/07/trial-courts-continue-to-struggle-with.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/09/expert-testimony-on-fibromyalgia.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/10/judge-sibum-of-monroe-county-allows-for.html
Here's a link to a prior Pennsylvania Law Weekly article of mine on the topic, entitled "Fibromyalgia as a Diagnosis in Personal Injury Cases":
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b1fc59d-4789-4f9e-be96-f157818c6d80
Based upon the above, it appears the the overwhelming current trend is that the trial courts have been willing to allow expert opinion linking a plaintiff's alleged fibromyalgia condition to a traumatic event to proceed ahead for a jury's consideration.
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