Judge Sibum of Monroe County Grants Summary Judgment Under Hills and Ridges Doctrine

In her recent decision in the case of Schecker v. Village Supermarkets, Inc., PICS Case No. 13-0491 (C.P. Monroe Feb. 13, 2013 Harlacher Sibum, J.), Monroe County Judge Jennifer Harlacher Sibum granted summary judgment to a defendant possessor of land in a snow and/or ice slip and fall case.

According to the opinion, the Plaintiff was dropped off at a supermarket by her husband.  She admittedly noticed that the cement walkway to the front of the store appeared wet but was not covered by snow or ice.  At the time she entered the store there was no snow otherwise in the parking lot and no precipitation was falling.

The Plaintiff exited the store about 15 minutes later pushing a shopping cart. As she walked across the cement surface outside the store she slipped and fell in an area just beyond the store's overhang.

In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that she was caused to fall by a slippery walkway and due to the fact that black ice was allegedly present where she fell.  Discovery confirmed, however, that there were no areas of ice or snow present and that the area merely appeared wet.

In her Opinion, Judge Sibum reviewed the parameters of the Hills and Ridges Doctrine and the issue of actual and/or constructive notice on the part of the Defendants.

Based upon the record before it, the court found that the Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the ice on which she allegedly slipped had accumulated in ridges or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute a danger as is all required under the Hills and Ridges Doctrine.

The Court also ruled that notice to the Defendant landowners could not be inferred from an employees' mere presence near the dangerous condition at the time of the incident.  Accordingly, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.


Anyone desiring a copy of this case may call the Pennsylvania Law Weekly's Instant Case Service at 1-800-276-7427 and give the above PICS Case No.  A small fee will be charged by the Instant Case Service.

Source:  "Case Digests." Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 12, 2013).

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Presenting 15th Annual Personal Injury Potpourri

I have accepted an invitation from Harris Bock, Esq. to be a presenter at The Dispute Resolution Institute's

15th Annual Personal Injury Potpourri

This CLE event is set to take place on April 16, 2013 at the Philadelphia Convention Center in Philadelphia, PA. My topic will be a "Comprehensive Civil Litigation Update."

Here are the details along with this LINK to the Register Online page -- Hope to see you there:

Superior Court's Latest Opinion on Stacking

Here is a LINK to the Pennsylvania Superior Court's latest decision on the issue of stacked UM coverage in the case of Bumbarger v. Peerless Ins. Co., 2013 Pa.Super. 47 (Pa.Super. March 8, 2013 Musmanno, J., Wecht, J., and Colville, J.)(Colville, J., dissenting)(Opinion by Wecht, J.).

In this case, the Plaintiff was involved in an accident with an uninsured driver and filed suit against her own carrier for uninsured motorists benefits.  An issue arose as to whether or not the Plaintiff was entitled to stacked coverage. 

The Plaintiff had waived stacked coverage when she originally purchased the policy for coverage on two vehicles.  She eventually later separately added two more vehicles to the policy but the carrier never obtained additional waivers of stacked coverage from the Plaintiff insured.  One of the additional vehicles was added under an endorsement to the policy and, when the fourth vehicle was added to the policy, it was not by way of an endorsement.

The Plaintiff contended that pursuant to the Sackett decisions, the carrier was required to obtain additional waivers of stacking from its insured when the third and fourth vehicles were added to the policy.  The Plaintiff asserted that the carrier breached the policy by failing to allow for stacked coverage.

If it was deemed by the court that the coverage need not be stacked, the Plaintiff would be entitled to $25,000 in coverage.  If stacked coverage was found to be warranted, the stacked coverage would have been $100,000.

After reviewing the law on the issue as applied to the particular facts presented, the court ruled that new waiver of stacking forms were required and that the failure to secure the waivers resulted in the Plaintiff being entitled to stacked coverage.

As this issue is somewhat convoluted, I have provided a link to the opinion above if you wish to review the same.  Here is a LINK to Judge Colville's dissenting opinion.

I send thanks to The Legal Intelligencer/Pennsylvania Law Weekly reporter Ben Present for bringing this case to my attention.

Split of Authority in Products Liability Standard Continues

Confusion continues to reign in Pennsylvania products liability law from conflicting decisions from Pennsylvania federal courts regarding whether the Restatement (Second) or (Third) of Torts should be applied:


Eastern District Federal Court
Kordek v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,  2013 WL 420332 (E.D. 2013)(Judge Mary A. McLaughlin applies Restatement (Third) of Torts as supported by Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions predicting that Pennsylvania Supreme Court will adopt Restatement (Third)).

The Eastern District decision in Kordek v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. may be viewed HERE.



Western District Federal Court

Gilmore v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2-12-CV-00547 (W.D.Pa. 2013)(Judge Arthur J. Schwab applies Restatement (Second) of Torts in products case given that Third Circuit's predictions have not come to pass).

Source:  Article by Saranac Hale-Spencer, "Judge Adds to Restatement Rift Among Federal Courts in State."  The Legal Intelligencer (March 8, 2013).

Anyone wishing to review the Western Federal District decision of Gilmore v. Ford Motor Co. may click this LINK

Sudden Medical Emergency Defense Must Be Pled As Affirmative Defense

In its recent February 22, 2013 decision in the case of Shiner v. Ralston, No. 1791 MDA 2011 (Pa.Super. 2013 Bowes, Ott, Strassburger, JJ.)(per curiam), the Pennsylvania Superior Court outlined the sudden medical emergency defense for motor vehicle accident matters and held that it should be pled as an affirmative defense when applicable.

The Shiner case involved allegations that a defendant driver lost consciousness as a result of a cardiac event immediately prior to the happening of the accident.  The defendant crossed a grassy median and struck the plaintiff's vehicle.  The plaintiff sustained injuries and the defendant was pronounced dead at the scene.

In its opinion the Superior Court distinguished the sudden medical emergency doctrine from the sudden emergency doctrine.  The sudden emergency doctrine provides that an individual is not held to the same ordinary standard of care when faced with a sudden emergency while driving, but rather, must utilize his or her best judgment under the circumstances.  In contrast, the sudden emergency medical defense, if raised as an affirmative defense and if proven, allows a defendant to avoid liability altogether.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click HERE.


Source:  Article by Ben Present: "'Sudden Medical Emergency' Ruled an Affirmative Defense," 36 Pennsylvania Law Weekly 214 (March 5, 2013).